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Constitutional Interpretation and History: New 
Originalism or Eclecticism? 
Stephen M. Feldman* 
Abstract 
The goal of originalism has always been purity. Originalists claim that 
their methods cleanse constitutional interpretation of politics, discretion, and 
indeterminacy. The key to attaining purity is history. Originalist methods 
supposedly discern in history a fixed constitutional meaning. Many originalists 
now claim that the most advanced method—the approach that reveals the 
purest constitutional meaning—is reasonable-person originalism. These new 
originalists ask the following question: When the Constitution was adopted, 
how would a hypothetical reasonable person have understood the text? This 
Article examines historical evidence from the early decades of nationhood to 
achieve two goals. First, it demonstrates that reasonable-person originalism is 
incoherent at its historical core. As an interpretive method, originalism cannot 
achieve its stated goal: to identify fixed and objective constitutional meanings. 
Contrary to originalist claims, historical research uncovers contingencies and 
contexts. More specifically, the evidence shows that reasonable-person 
originalism is historically unjustified. Early in the nation’s history, neither 
lawyers nor laypersons would have suggested that constitutional interpretation 
should be based on the views of a hypothetical reasonable person. Second, the 
Article demonstrates that the historical evidence instead supports an alterna-
tive conception of constitutional interpretation. In the early decades, numerous 
Americans—including framers, Supreme Court justices, and constitutional 
scholars—used an eclectic or pluralist approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion. Depending on the case, an eclectic interpreter considered a shifting vari-
ety of factors, including original meaning, framers’ intentions, practical con-
sequences, and judicial precedents. 
 
* Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Po-
litical Science, University of Wyoming. I thank Jack Balkin, Mark Tushnet, and Sam Kalen for 
their comments on earlier drafts and Joshua Eames for his research assistance. 
FELDMAN.FINAL (UPDATED 6.11) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2014 8:04 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 28 
284 
Table of Contents 
I. ELABORATING REASONABLE-PERSON ORIGINALISM ................... 8 
A. Justification ........................................................................... 8 
B. An Advance ......................................................................... 12 
II. REASONABLE-PERSON ORIGINALISM AS INTERPRETIVE 
METHOD: THE COMPLEXITY OF HISTORY .......................... 16 
III. A HISTORY OF THE REASONABLE PERSON AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION .................................. 22 
A. Introduction to Historical Evidence ................................... 23 
B. Newspapers and the Reasonable Man ................................ 25 
C. Dictionaries ........................................................................ 27 
D. Case Law: From Reason to Reasonable Man .................... 28 
E. Case Law: On Constitutional Interpretation ..................... 35 
F. Legal Treatises .................................................................... 46 
G. Framers and Ratifiers ......................................................... 52 
IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 67 
INTRODUCTION 
The goal of originalism has always been purity. Originalists claim 
their methods cleanse constitutional interpretation of politics, discre-
tion, and indeterminacy.1 The key to attaining purity is history. 
Originalist methods supposedly discern in history a fixed constitu-
tional meaning.2 And when judges and scholars can discern a fixed 
meaning, then constitutional interpretation becomes objective, possi-
bly even mechanical.3 
 
 1. Accord Stephen G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 701 (2009); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The 
President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 551–52 (1994). 
 2. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 
(2011); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 611 (2004). 
Lawrence Solum refers approvingly to this key point as “the fixation thesis.” Lawrence B. Solum, 
We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 4 (2011). 
 3. Randy Barnett writes: 
“[N]ew originalism” shares with the originalism of the 1980s—and all other forms of 
originalism—the core propositions that (a) the textual meaning of a written constitu-
tion is fixed at the time its language is enacted, and (b) this fixed meaning should re-
main the same until it is properly changed. The intuitive appeal of originalism rests 
on the proposition that the original public meaning is an objective fact that can be 
established by reference to historical materials. 
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Advances in originalist theory, therefore, demand greater purity.4 
For instance, critics emphasized that early originalist method (‘old 
originalism’), which focused on framers’ intentions, engendered ambi-
guity and complexity because the various framers aimed for diverse 
goals.5 Consequently, ‘new originalists’ claimed that a focus on original 
public meaning achieved greater purity by overcoming such problems. 
Rather than concentrating on the framers, constitutional interpreters 
were to discern how the ratifiers and the wider public understood the 
constitutional text.6 Yet, critics soon demonstrated that this emphasis 
on original public meaning also raised numerous problematic ques-
tions.7 For instance, what if the founding-era public was largely igno-
rant of the Constitution and its meaning?8 What if eligible voters at 
the time were apathetic?9 Such difficulties led to a further refinement 
of originalist method. Many originalists now claim that the most ad-
vanced method—the approach that reveals the purest constitutional 
meaning—is reasonable-person originalism. These new originalists 
ask the following question: How would a hypothetical reasonable per-
son, when the Constitution was adopted, have understood the text?10 
 
Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 615, 660 (2009). 
 4. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s 
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1114 (2003) (stating that originalism is “working itself 
pure”); see generally James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 
97 VA. L. REV. 1523 (2011) (celebrating advances in and a growing consensus around originalist 
research). 
 5. For examples of early originalism, see generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY 
JUDICIARY (1977); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1 (1971). 
 6. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 38 (1998); ROBERT BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143–44 (1990). 
 7. Robert W. Bennett, Originalism and the Living American Constitution, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 78, 104–05 (2011) (identifying numerous ques-
tions). 
 8. See Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political Ignorance, 97 MINN. L. REV. 625 (2012). 
 9. Only approximately four percent of the population voted in the ratification elections. 
LESLIE PAUL THIELE, THINKING POLITICS 87 (1997). 
 10. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 621–22 
(1999); see also Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 4, at 1132, 1138; Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, 
Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006); John O. McGinnis & 
Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case 
Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 761 (2009) [hereinafter Methods]; John O. McGin-
nis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 371, 374 (2007) [hereinafter Principles]. While Solum does not expressly invoke a 
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In the words of Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, “an all-star roster of 
originalist scholars” have “endorsed reliance upon the reasonable per-
son in constitutional interpretation.”11 
New originalists have justified their interpretive methods with four 
main rationales.12 First, they argue that originalism has no competi-
tion. There is no legitimate alternative method of constitutional inter-
pretation.13 And as Justice Scalia put it: “You can’t beat somebody with 
nobody.”14 Second, they argue that the writtenness of the Constitution 
necessitates originalism. The Constitution is written law and should 
be interpreted accordingly.15 Third, they argue that popular sover-
eignty requires originalism.16 Only originalism, Scalia insists, is “com-
patible with the nature and purpose of a Constitution in a democratic 
system.”17 Finally, they argue that history demonstrates that new 
originalism is grounded in the framing era. In his book on the history 
of originalism, Johnathan O’Neill stated that “[t]he originalist ap-
proach was present in American constitutional law and thought since 
the country’s founding.”18 
Not all reasonable-person originalists articulate the historical jus-
tification in precisely the same way. Randy Barnett draws extensively 
 
reasonable person, he comes close: “So when we read the Constitution of 1789, our question 
should be, ‘How would an ordinary American citizen fluent in English as spoken in the late eight-
eenth century have understood the words and phrases that make up its clauses?’” Solum, supra 
note 2, at 3 (emphasis added). For more extensive narrative histories of originalism, see 
JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY (2005); Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 720–
24 (2011). 
 11. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 10, at 48–49 n.11. 
 12. In this paragraph, I cite some new originalists who are not necessarily reasonable-per-
son originalists. 
 13. Barnett, supra note 10, at 617; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 849, 862–63 (1989). 
 14. Scalia, supra note 13, at 855. 
 15. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 303–04 
(2007); Barnett, supra note 10, at 629–36; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 1, at 551–52. 
 16. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 154 (1999); Akhil 
Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 34–35 (2000). 
 17. Scalia, supra note 13, at 862. 
 18. O’NEILL, supra note 10, at 5. O’Neill argued, though, that “by the 1930s [originalist] 
conceptions of constitutional authority and legitimate interpretation had been marginalized.” Id.; 
see Matthew J. Franck, The Original Originalist, NAT’L REVIEW, Jan. 28, 2013, at 28, 30 (main-
taining that Robert Bork’s originalism was the accepted method of constitutional interpretation 
from the founding until the 1930s). 
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from James Madison to show the errors of old originalism: Madison 
and the other framers did not believe their own subjective intentions 
were relevant to constitutional meaning. Yet, Barnett adds, Madison 
maintained that the “true meaning” of the Constitution was its “public 
meaning,” as determined by “the established rules of interpretation.”19 
Meanwhile, Lawson and Seidman provide a more protracted historical 
justification.20 They begin by describing the Constitution as “an in-
struction manual for a form of government.”21 Given this premise, one 
must interpret the Constitution in accord with originalism, they argue, 
because it supposedly provides the only reasonable method for follow-
ing constitutional instructions.22 Even so, one must still determine 
which originalist method to follow: What type of originalism harmo-
nizes best with a lawyer’s (rather than a historian’s) use of history? The 
historical materials demonstrate that many people contributed to the 
framing and ratification of the Constitution. If a constitutional inter-
preter attempts to discern the meaning of the text by examining the 
thoughts or intentions of all these people, or even a small segment of 
them—such as the framers or the delegates to the state ratifying con-
ventions—then the interpreter inevitably becomes entangled in the 
brambles of historical ambiguity.23 A historian might relish such ambi-
guity, but a lawyer (or judge) needs to follow the constitutional instruc-
tions. Thus, Lawson and Seidman conclude: the “[h]istorical facts” 
show that the only originalist method a lawyer can use to avoid these 
brambles is reasonable-person originalism.24 “The reasonable Ameri-
can person of 1788 determines, for 1788 and today, the meaning of the 
federal Constitution.”25 
 
 19. Barnett, supra note 10, at 625–26. Barnett was drawing from an earlier article: H. Jef-
ferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). To be 
clear, Barnett did not rely on history as the primary justification for new originalism. Barnett, 
supra note 10, at 617–48. Barnett, though, does repeat this historical argument in his book. 
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 94–100 (2004). 
 20. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 10, at 51–70. 
 21. Id. at 53. 
 22. Id. at 51–53. 
 23. Id. at 61–67. 
 24. Id. at 61. 
 25. Id. at 48. “[T]he touchstone is . . . the hypothetical understandings of a reasonable 
person [from 1788] who is artificially constructed by lawyers.” Id. 
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Historical inquiry, it might be said, is doubly important to reason-
able-person originalists, as it is both the crux of the interpretive 
method and one of its key justifications.26 Thus, this Article examines 
historical evidence from the early decades of nationhood with two 
goals in mind. First, the Article demonstrates that reasonable-person 
originalism is incoherent at its historical core. As an interpretive 
method, originalism cannot achieve its stated goal: to identify fixed and 
objective constitutional meanings. Contrary to originalist claims, his-
torical research uncovers contingencies and contexts.27 More specifi-
cally, the evidence shows that reasonable-person originalism is histor-
ically unjustified. Early in the nation’s history, neither lawyers nor 
laypersons would have suggested that constitutional interpretation 
should be based on the views of a hypothetical reasonable person. Sec-
ond, the Article shows that the historical evidence supports an alterna-
tive conception of constitutional interpretation. In the early decades, 
numerous Americans—including framers, Supreme Court justices, 
and constitutional scholars—used an eclectic or pluralist approach to 
constitutional interpretation, an approach that some scholars might 
categorize as a flexible pragmatism.28 Depending on the case, an eclec-
tic interpreter considered a shifting variety of factors, including origi-
nal meaning, framers’ intentions, practical consequences, judicial prec-
edents, and so forth. To be clear, eclecticism is closely related to what 
is currently called “living constitutionalism,” which emphasizes that 
the meaning of the Constitution “evolves, changes over time, and 
adapts to new circumstances, without being formally amended.”29 That 
 
 26. The same is true for some other originalists as well. Keith Whittington happily reports 
that, with the emergence of new originalism, constitutional controversies now “are primarily his-
torical debates, which is where originalists claimed the constitutional argument should be.” Whit-
tington, supra note 2, at 608 (emphasis in original). Many constitutional issues thus revolve 
around “detailed historical research.” Id. 
 27. History inevitably shows how individuals reacted to their political, social, and cultural 
surroundings and could have acted differently, especially if their contextual environments had 
shifted. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 9–10 (1996); Gordon S. Wood, The Fundamen-
talists and the Constitution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 18, 1988, at 33. 
 28. E.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY 
(2010); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988). 
“Pragmatist constitutional adjudication is eclectic and uncertain: it takes into account multiple 
sources, and rarely produces an unequivocal answer.” Id. at 29. 
 29. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1 (2010); see Bennett, supra note 7 
(defending living constitutionalism). 
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is, an eclectic interpretive approach is likely to generate changing or 
variable constitutional understandings. My historical argument, how-
ever, focuses on showing that early Americans used multiple interpre-
tive approaches—hence, eclecticism—rather than showing that they 
believed in the evolution of constitutional meaning. 
To facilitate attaining its two goals, this Article focuses on the 
widely-cited coauthors, John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, 
who have unequivocally adopted reasonable-person originalism.30 
“[T]he focus of originalism,” they assert, “should be on how a reason-
able person at the time of the Constitution’s adoption would have un-
derstood its words and thought they should be interpreted.”31 They 
sharply distinguish reasonable-person originalism from other original-
ist approaches while also defending it vigorously.32 Moreover, their 
primary defense of originalism is historical. More so than other theo-
rists, McGinnis and Rappaport dig deeply into the historical materials 
in their effort to justify reasonable-person originalism.33 
 
 30. See supra note 10 (identifying reasonable-person originalists). For examples of citations 
and discussions of McGinnis and Rappaport, see Barnett, supra note 2, at 71 n.14;  Jack M. Balkin, 
Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 454–55 (2007)Ste-
ven G. Calabresi, A Critical Introduction to the Originalism Debate, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
875, 886–87 (2008);Ozan O. Varol, The Origins and Limits of Originalism: A Comparative Study, 
44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1239, 1241 n.1 (2011). 
 31. Principles, supra note 10, at 374. 
 32. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 
GEO. L.J. 1693 (2010) [hereinafter Good]; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Prag-
matic Defense of Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 917 (2008) [hereinafter Pragmatic] 
(McGinnis and Rappaport published an earlier version of this essay: John O. McGinnis & Mi-
chael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 68 
(2007)); Methods, supra note 10; Principles, supra note 10. McGinnis and Rappaport have also pub-
lished articles explaining the problematic relationship between originalism and precedent. John 
O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Precedent, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
121 (2011) (shorter version of an earlier article: John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803 (2009)). 
 33. Gary L. McDowell, perhaps, has articulated the most comprehensive historical justi-
fication for originalism. GARY L. MCDOWELL, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2010). But McDowell elides the differ-
ence between old and new originalism. Throughout much of the book, he emphasizes the inten-
tions of the framers, see, e.g., id. at 312 (discussing Marshall and framers’ intentions), but then at 
the end, he claims to have been discussing original public meaning. Id. at 324, 331. 
Finally, it is worth highlighting that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the con-
troversial recess appointments case, NLRB v. Canning. 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted, 133 S.Ct. 2861 (June 24, 2013) (No. 12-1281). In the lower court decision, the D.C. 
Circuit followed new originalism, repeatedly cited one of Rappaport’s articles, and held uncon-
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Part I of this Article elaborates reasonable-person originalism. It 
first explains how McGinnis and Rappaport use history to justify and 
describe their brand of originalism, and then explains why they believe 
a reasonable-person approach advances beyond other forms of 
originalism. Part II criticizes reasonable-person originalism by show-
ing that it must fail as a method of constitutional interpretation. Part 
III, the heart of the Article, demonstrates that reasonable-person 
originalism is, quite simply, ahistorical. Drawing on a wide range of 
historical sources, from newspapers to legal treatises, this Part shows 
that the reasonable person (or reasonable man) was not a commonly 
invoked legal standard during the founding era. These sources further 
reveal that early constitutional interpreters were eclectic rather than 
narrowly originalist. One cannot fairly conclude that the founders and 
other early Americans were reasonable-person originalists (or any 
other type of originalists) without ignoring large chunks of historical 
evidence. Part IV is a brief conclusion. 
I. ELABORATING REASONABLE-PERSON ORIGINALISM 
A. Justification 
McGinnis and Rappaport justify reasonable-person originalism 
with a complex four-step argument that intertwines history with prag-
matism. They summarize their argument as follows: 
First, entrenched constitutional provisions that are desirable should 
take priority over ordinary legislation, because such entrenchments 
operate to establish a beneficial framework of government and rights. 
Second, appropriate supermajority rules tend to produce desirable 
entrenchments by generating constitutional provisions that are 
widely supported and are likely to produce net benefits. Third, ap-
propriate supermajority rules have generally governed the passage of 
the Constitution and its amendments. Finally, this argument for the 
desirability of the Constitution requires that judges interpret the 
document based only on its original meaning because those at the 
 
stitutional President Obama’s recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board. Can-
ning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 at 503, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Michael B. Rappaport, The 
Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1487 (2005)). 
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time of the enactment used only that meaning in deciding whether 
to adopt the Constitution.34 
The first three steps of this argument explain the desirability of our 
Constitution from a pragmatic and historical standpoint. McGinnis 
and Rappaport justify constitutional fidelity. The crux of their position 
is that supermajority enactment requirements are apt to produce prag-
matically beneficial legislative-constitutional rules—that is, a “good 
constitution,”35 likely to promote “the welfare of the people.”36 Thus, 
the historical ratification of the original Constitution and its subse-
quent amendments pursuant to such supermajority requirements as 
imposed by Articles VII and V has endowed Americans with a Consti-
tution worthy of admiration and devotion.37 In other words, history 
and pragmatism together point toward fidelity. “The essence of our 
argument,”38 McGinnis and Rappaport write, “is that the strict super-
majoritarian rules that governed the Constitution’s enactment make it 
socially desirable.”39 Constitutional provisions, therefore, should take 
priority over ordinary legislative enactments, which are adopted pur-
suant to “mere majoritarian” requirements.40 
 
 34. Principles, supra note 10, at 374; see Pragmatic, supra note 32, at 919–20 (reiterating 
these four points). 
 35. Good, supra note 32, at 1698. 
 36. Id. McGinnis and Rappaport have defended their emphasis on the importance of su-
permajoritarian adoption requirements in additional essays. E.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael 
B. Rappaport, The Condorcet Case for Supermajority Rules, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 67 (2008); 
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Supermajoritarianism: Defending the 
Nexus, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 18 (2007) (replying to Ethan J. Leib, Why Supermajori-
tarianism Does Not Illuminate the Debate Between Originalists and Non-originalists, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 113 (2007)); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritar-
ian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703 (2002). 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. V (establishing official amendment process); U.S. CONST. art. VII 
(establishing initial ratification process); Good, supra note 32, at 1720–33. McGinnis and Rap-
paport recognize an obvious criticism of their argument: because women and African Americans 
were excluded from democratic participation during the original ratification (and much of the 
nation’s subsequent history), the Constitution was not in fact adopted pursuant to a supermajori-
tarian process. They respond initially (in my opinion, inadequately) by arguing largely that the 
eventual grants of suffrage to women and African Americans overcome this potential obstacle to 
their originalist argument. Pragmatic, supra note 32, at 932–35. They subsequently expanded their 
response by arguing that, given these defects in the original supermajoritarian processes, original-
ism still presents the best interpretive approach. Good, supra note 32, at 1753–64. 
 38. Pragmatic, supra note 32, at 920. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. McGinnis and Rappaport’s argument, in this regard, overlaps with Bruce Acker-
man’s dualist constitutional theory, distinguishing ordinary legislative actions from constitutional 
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Significantly, the fourth step of McGinnis and Rappaport’s argu-
ment is the only one focused on constitutional interpretation. It is pri-
marily historical, though linked to their (historical and pragmatic) ar-
gument for constitutional fidelity, embodied in the first three 
argumentative steps. McGinnis and Rappaport emphasize that Amer-
icans chose to adopt the Constitution and its amendments pursuant to 
the required supermajority processes in light of the contemporary 
meanings of the various constitutional provisions—that is, in light of 
the respective constitutional meanings at the times of ratification. Be-
cause commonly accepted contemporary (or original) public meaning 
prompted ratification, McGinnis and Rappaport reason, judges should 
interpret the Constitution in accord with that original meaning.41 
This conclusion leads to an additional crucial question: How 
would Americans, at the various times of ratification, but especially 
during the original founding era, have discerned the respective consti-
tutional meanings? McGinnis and Rappaport answer: Americans 
would interpret “the [constitutional] provisions based on commonly 
accepted meanings and the interpretive rules of the time.”42 Some con-
stitutional provisions would have been clear and some ambiguous, but 
either way, Americans would have interpreted them—and would have 
assumed they would be interpreted in the future—“based on familiar 
interpretative rules.”43 Consequently, McGinnis and Rappaport main-
tain that appropriate rules for constitutional interpretation must be 
discovered through historical research. Only history can reveal the 
original interpretive methods that Americans would have used during 
ratification. And the historical evidence, according to McGinnis and 
Rappaport, reveals that a reasonable American during the founding era 
would have interpreted the Constitution pursuant to widely accepted 
legal interpretive rules. A reasonable or “competent speaker of the lan-
guage,”44 they explain, would have given “legal meaning priority over 
 
moments. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6–10 (1991). Yet, contrary to 
Ackerman, McGinnis, and Rappaport strongly reject the possibility of amending the Constitution 
outside of the supermajoritarian process imposed by Article V. Good, supra note 32, at 1741–48. 
 41. Pragmatic, supra note 32, at 925–26. 
 42. Id. at 925 
 43. Id. at 926. 
 44. Methods, supra note 10, at 765. 
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ordinary meaning”45 when interpreting the Constitution because, after 
all, the Constitution was a legal document.46 Moreover, the legal in-
terpretive rules “were broadly originalist in the modern sense of the 
term.”47 McGinnis and Rappaport write: “Based on our review of the 
different types of [historical] evidence, we suggest that all of these 
roads likely lead to Rome. In other words, the bulk of the evidence 
points to some form of originalism.”48 
In sum, McGinnis and Rappaport conclude that constitutional in-
terpretation should manifest the views of a reasonable person applying 
the original interpretive methods (contemporaneous with ratification). 
Thus, a complete though cumbersome descriptive label for McGinnis 
and Rappaport’s interpretive approach would be ‘original-methods 
reasonable-person originalism.’ To avoid such an ungainly appellation, 
however, I will continue to call it ‘reasonable-person originalism.’49 
Regardless of the label, McGinnis and Rappaport’s originalism is his-
torical through and through. First, McGinnis and Rappaport insist 
that history must justify any legitimate interpretive approach. “Even if 
a particular interpretive theory could be shown to be the best philo-
sophical account of meaning,” they emphasize, “that account would 
not show that this particular theory should be employed. If that philo-
sophical approach was not followed by the enactors, then employing it 
to interpret the Constitution will produce a different meaning than the 
one the enactors expected.”50 To be sure, “policy or philosophical con-
siderations” might help one appreciate the advantages and disad-
vantages of competing interpretive approaches, but such considera-
tions cannot be determinative.51 Only history can reveal “the correct 
approach” to constitutional interpretation.52 Second, McGinnis and 
Rappaport insist not only that history must justify the general inter-
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 786. 
 48. Id. at 788; see id. at 769–70 (elaborating the historical evidence). 
 49. McGinnis and Rappaport sometimes explicitly refer to their approach as “original 
methods originalism.” E.g., Good, supra note 32, at 1696; Methods, supra note 10, at 751. 
 50. Methods, supra note 10, at 787. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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pretive approach—that is, originalism—but also that history must re-
veal the precise contours of that method. They emphasize: “The con-
tent of the original interpretive rules depends on historical facts: what 
were the interpretive rules deemed applicable by the enactors?”53 And 
in the end, this historical focus on the original interpretive rules leads 
McGinnis and Rappaport to their specific conclusion. Reasonable-per-
son originalism is the only legitimate method for interpreting the Con-
stitution. 
B. An Advance 
The thrust of McGinnis and Rappaport’s argument is that history 
justifies using reasonable-person originalism as well as specifying its 
precise contours as an interpretive method. But they also underscore 
that reasonable-person originalism represents an advance over other 
originalist methods. When old originalism, focused on the framers’ in-
tentions, first emerged, its jurisprudential appeal arose from its claim 
to objectivity.54 Old originalism appeared to overcome the complexi-
ties and ambiguities that crippled various nonoriginalist methods, 
which emphasized sources as diverse as moral principles, societal con-
sensus, and natural law.55 Yet, critics soon demonstrated that old 
originalism, too, led to indeterminacy. A multimember group such as 
the framers, critics pointed out, does not have a stable and determinate 
intention.56 An individual might have a single discernible intent, but a 
group does not. Group members are likely to entertain varied inten-
tions. Thus, soon after ratification Alexander Hamilton argued that the 
Constitution imbued Congress with the power to charter a national 
bank, while James Madison disagreed.57 
 
 53. Good, supra note 32, at 1735. 
 54. E.g., Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 
WASH. U.L.Q. 695. 
 55. For a summary of nonoriginalist methods and an explanation of their inevitable inde-
terminacy, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 43–72 (1980). 
 56. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 
209–18 (1980). 
 57. Compare ALEXANDER HAMILTON, OPINION ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
BANK (Feb. 23, 1791), reprinted in GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 164 (Richard Hof-
stadter ed., 1958) [hereinafter HAMILTON, OPINION] with JAMES MADISON, SPEECH IN 
CONGRESS OPPOSING THE NATIONAL BANK (Feb. 2, 1791), reprinted in JAMES MADISON: 
WRITINGS 480 (Library of America 1999) [hereinafter MADISON, SPEECH]. 
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Difficulties such as these provoked originalists to move on to new 
originalism. Constitutional interpreters, according to new originalists, 
should focus on original public meaning rather than original intent. 
Framers’ intent might be indeterminate, but original meaning could 
nonetheless provide an objective ground for constitutional interpreta-
tion.58 New originalists thus believed they had laid the indeterminacy 
problem to rest. Yet, once these new originalists began to investigate 
the public meanings of particular provisions more deeply, they en-
countered a familiar problem. Original public meaning might be based 
on how delegates to the various state ratifying conventions had under-
stood the constitutional text, or it might be based on how the people 
who voted for those delegates had understood the text. Either way, if 
original public meaning equated with actual (original) understand-
ing—either that of the ratifiers or that of the people—then the inde-
terminacy problem once again reared its ugly head, like a zombie in a 
Hollywood movie, but now there were many more zombies rampaging 
around. Thirty-nine framers signed the original Constitution.59 The 
number of ratification delegates was far larger: 1,649 delegates at-
tended the state ratifying conventions, with 1,072 voting in favor of 
ratification.60 And, of course, the number of people voting in the rati-
fication elections (choosing the delegates) was far larger still. How 
could one discern a single coherent original public meaning when his-
torical evidence might demonstrate that different ratifiers (or different 
people) had understood the Constitution differently?61 Actual original 
understanding proved just as problematic as framers’ intentions. 
Unsurprisingly, then, advocates for reasonable-person originalism, 
including McGinnis and Rappaport, emphasize that a reasonable-per-
son standard overcomes the indeterminacy problem.62 Instead of in-
quiring into the actual understandings of the ratifiers or the people, a 
 
 58. See Colby, supra note 10, at 720–21 (describing the development of originalism). 
 59. II THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 1, 586–90 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1966 reprint of 1937 rev. ed.) [hereinafter Records]. 
 60. See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the State Ratifying Conventions 
as a Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 467–69 
(listing votes at the state ratifying conventions). 
 61. Cf., Walter Benn Michaels, A Defense of Old Originalism. 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
21, 23 (2009) (criticizing new originalism). 
 62. See Colby, supra note 10, at 722–24 (describing the movement to reasonable-person 
originalism). 
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constitutional interpreter conceptualizes how a reasonable person, at 
the time of ratification, would have understood the Constitution.63 
Unlike a diverse group of people, such as the ratifiers, a reasonable 
person can be hypothesized to have a single understanding for any par-
ticular constitutional provision, thus revealing a coherent and deter-
minate original meaning. McGinnis and Rappaport add that reasona-
ble-person originalism improves on other forms of originalism in 
another, though related, way. Some new originalists, such as Keith 
Whittington and Jack Balkin, argue that ambiguous constitutional 
provisions allow judges (or other governmental officials) to exit con-
stitutional interpretation and to engage in an alternative activity: con-
stitutional construction.64 As typically posited, construction is more 
creative and open-ended than interpretation because it is untethered 
from the usual constraining rules of interpretation. Balkin, for in-
stance, insists that he is a new originalist, yet he finds that construction 
leads to the constitutional protection of a woman’s right to choose 
whether to abort.65 
McGinnis and Rappaport argue that their reasonable-person 
originalism obviates any need to exit from constitutional interpreta-
tion.66 Whittington, Balkin, and other constructionists enter their con-
struction sites because they see no other legitimate means for resolving 
constitutional ambiguities.67 As McGinnis and Rappaport explain, con-
structionists believe that, in some cases, “original meaning runs 
out”68—some constitutional provisions are irredeemably “ambiguous 
or vague”69—and “therefore the judge (or other official) must decide 
the matter based on nonoriginalist considerations.”70 A judge, in such 
a case, is encouraged to decide based on non-legal “normative stand-
ards rather than legal methods.”71 
 
 63. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 10, at 61–67; Methods, supra note 10, at 758-65. 
 64. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3–6, 256–68 (2011); Whittington, supra 
note 16, at 5–11. 
 65. Balkin, supra note 15. 
 66. Methods, supra note 10, at 752–53, 772–76. 
 67. E.g., Whittington, supra note 16, at 5, 206–07. 
 68. Methods, supra note 10, at 773. 
 69. Id. at 772. 
 70. Id. at 773. 
 71. Id. 
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McGinnis and Rappaport repudiate this view and the distinction 
between interpretation and construction for two reasons. First, a judge 
who follows reasonable-person originalism, McGinnis and Rappaport 
argue, never needs to decide cases pursuant to non-legal or “extracon-
stitutional norms.”72 Why so? Because the reasonable-person interpre-
tive standard can resolve all textual ambiguities. “[W]hen constitu-
tional language appears ambiguous or vague,”73 McGinnis and 
Rappaport write, then the originalist judge should “choose the most 
probable interpretation available with the aid of interpretive rules—
norms internal to the enterprise of originalism.”74 Reasonable-person 
originalist method, in other words, can lay bare a satisfactorily fixed 
and objective constitutional meaning in all cases. Thus, just as reason-
able-person originalism can overcome the indeterminacy that infected 
framers’-intent originalism and actual-understanding originalism, rea-
sonable-person originalism can also erase any potential constitutional 
ambiguities that might otherwise engender construction. Second, 
McGinnis and Rappaport reject constitutional construction because it 
is not historically justified. “[A]dvocates of construction have not pro-
vided evidence that anyone embraced construction at the time of the 
Constitution’s enactment, and we have been able to find none.”75 
McGinnis and Rappaport had declared that they could not support any 
interpretive theory that was not grounded in the historical materials—
and apparently, they meant it.76 Ultimately, their historical research 
always leads them back to reasonable-person originalism, which they 
therefore deem the only legitimate interpretive method.77 
 
 72. Id. Deciding pursuant to legal rules or standards is a virtue in itself, according to rea-
sonable-person originalists. Lawson and Seidman argue that the “reasonable person” is a legal 
construct that is thoroughly familiar to lawyers and judges. Thus, reasonable-person originalism 
reestablishes lawyers and judges rather than historians as the preeminent experts in constitutional 
interpretation. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 10, at 48–51, 79–80. 
 73. Methods, supra note 10, at 773. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 787. 
 77. Id. at 773. 
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II. REASONABLE-PERSON ORIGINALISM AS INTERPRETIVE 
METHOD: THE COMPLEXITY OF HISTORY 
As McGinnis and Rappaport depict reasonable-person originalism, 
it has two great virtues. First, as an interpretive method, it eradicates 
complexity and indeterminacy. The reasonable-person standard cuts 
through the convolutions that riddle other interpretive approaches, 
whether originalist or otherwise. Second, reasonable-person original-
ism is historically grounded in the adoption of the original Constitu-
tion and its amendments. This Part critiques the methodological 
claim. The next Part focuses on the historical evidence. 
All forms of originalism appeal to history to resolve constitutional 
ambiguities. Instead of more present-minded and apparently open-
ended interpretive approaches—which originalists typically dump to-
gether in a sack called ‘nonoriginalism’—originalists claim that his-
tory, in some shape or form, can reveal a fixed and objective constitu-
tional meaning. Constitutional interpretation is purified. Politics and 
indeterminacy are banished from judicial decision-making. In this re-
gard, reasonable-person originalism is no different from other 
originalisms.78 The reasonable person of the founding era, discovered 
through historical research, will tell us, today, what the Constitution 
means—or so McGinnis and Rappaport (and other reasonable-person 
originalists) profess. 
A rather large obstacle, however, blocks reasonable-person 
originalism—an obstacle that McGinnis and Rappaport (and other 
originalists) conveniently ignore. Namely, historical thinking leads to 
complexity rather than to univocal and determinate factual nuggets.79 
When a historian confronts a textual document, he or she does not 
seek to understand its surface meaning because, from the historian’s 
standpoint, any such surface meaning is either insignificant or nonex-
istent. Texts, to historians, “are slippery, cagey, and protean, reflecting 
the uncertainty and disingenuity of the real world.”80 A text is never 
 
 78. See Barnett, supra note 3, at 660 (describing core propositions of all originalisms). 
 79.  Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 49 (Amy Gutmann Ed., 1997). 
 80. SAM WINEBURG, HISTORICAL THINKING AND OTHER UNNATURAL ACTS 66 
(2001). For a historian’s critique of the new originalism, see Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution 
vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate Over Originalism, 
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merely or simply what is “set down on paper.”81 Thus, when examining 
a text, a historian seeks to appreciate and reconstruct its surrounding 
“social context.”82 If successful, the historian can begin to glimpse the 
subtexts, the meanings hidden below the surface of the document—
meanings that often are far more important than any superficial ones 
floating on the surface. A historian who ignores subtext is likely to skew 
or warp the significance of a document. 
From the historian’s standpoint, then, reasonable-person original-
ists attempt to use “history without historicism.”83 Historicism stresses 
that all human actions, thoughts, and events occur in a context of con-
tingent and changing social, cultural, and political arrangements.84 
The contexts and the contingencies engender, for a historian, the sub-
texts, the layers of underlying meaning. But originalists disregard con-
text, contingency, and subtext. Originalists, that is, use history without 
a “historicist sensibility” or historical understanding.85 They want to 
find a fixed objective meaning when a historical text, such as the Con-
stitution—especially, the Constitution, which forged a nation in a po-
litical crucible—is roiling with subtexts. Originalists resemble naive 
students rather than historians. While historians seek “to engage” with 
a text, situating it “in a social world” and digging for subtexts, students 
instead view texts more simply, as “serving as bearers of information.”86 
For instance, most historians consider the source of a text—who said 
or wrote it—to be crucial, a marker to locate early in the journey to-
ward textual understanding. But for a student, the source is usually, at 
 
23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295 (2011). For a historian’s explanation of the many difficulties con-
fronting even the best historians, see DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES 
(1970). 
 81. WINEBURG, supra note 80, at 66–67; see Cornell, supra note 80, at 299 n.18 (explaining 
“that texts are complex historical constructions, not magic mirrors into the past”). 
 82. WINEBURG, supra note 80, at 67. 
 83. Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1188 (2008); see 
Cornell, supra note 80, at 334–37 (criticizing the historical work of new originalists). 
 84. G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 
485, 506 (2002); Wood, supra note 27. 
 85. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-
1835, at 6 (1991); see FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 107–18 (2013) 
(summarizing historians’ criticisms of originalism). 
 86. WINEBURG, supra note 80, at 76. 
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most, an afterthought at the end of the journey, a mere final fact to 
mention about a text.87 
McGinnis and Rappaport act as if they can extract a semantic 
meaning from the Constitution regardless of the political contexts of 
the framing and ratification, regardless of the particular political views 
of the various speakers and writers. Their means of extraction is the 
reasonable person: In McGinnis and Rappaport’s hands, the reasona-
ble person supposedly filters out all the contexts and contingencies, all 
the complexities and ambiguities, leaving the text with a raw and ac-
cessible objective meaning. Yet, at the close of the constitutional con-
vention, Benjamin Franklin emphasized that the proposed Constitu-
tion was thoroughly political. “[W]hen you assemble a number of men 
to have the advantage of their joint wisdom,” he said,88 “you inevitably 
assemble with those men, all their prejudices, their passions, their er-
rors of opinion, their local interests, and their selfish views. From such 
an assembly can a perfect production be expected?”89 
Given this, one should recognize that many of the framers—the 
delegates to the Philadelphia (constitutional) convention—were not 
necessarily the most esteemed political leaders or intellectuals in their 
respective states. When Thomas Jefferson described the named dele-
gates as “an assembly of demi-gods,”90 he was being either hyperbolic 
or overly influenced by the atypical Virginia delegation (which in-
cluded James Madison, George Mason, George Wythe, and the iconic 
George Washington).91 Other observers more reasonably described 
the collection of delegates as a somewhat average cross-section “of 
ability, integrity, and patriotism.”92 Many appointments to the state 
delegations occurred because of convenience when, for instance, more 
desirable or accomplished individuals were unavailable or otherwise 
declined to participate, sometimes due to skepticism about the political 
 
 87. Id. at 76–77. 
 88. Benjamin Franklin, Speech at the Conclusion of the Constitutional Convention (Sept. 17, 
1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 3, 4 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993). 
 89. Id. 
 90. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
39 (1913) (quoting Jefferson). 
 91. Id. at 14–18. 
 92. Id. at 40. 
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goals.93 Was “the sole and express purpose” of the Philadelphia con-
vention truly to amend the Articles of Confederation and retain a con-
federacy of strong state governments—as Congress had resolved94—or 
was it instead to scrap the Articles and replace it with a new constitu-
tional document that would institute a powerful central government? 
When asked why he had refused to join the Philadelphia convention, 
Patrick Henry declared, “I smelt a Rat.”95 
Even so, in the end, Franklin fully endorsed the final Philadelphia 
document not because it was perfect; he explicitly confessed that he 
did “not entirely approve” of it.96 Rather, Franklin concluded that, in 
his view of the current political circumstances, first, a new constitution 
was necessary, and second, the proposed document was likely the best 
that could be attained.97 If anything, then, Franklin’s observations 
seem to caution against efforts to distill a pure semantic meaning from 
the constitutional text, as if the politics could be extracted from its con-
tent. Indeed, during the ensuing debates over ratification, when some 
Antifederalists called for a second convention—one that might pro-
duce a better constitutional document—Federalists resisted partly be-
cause they knew the proposed document had arisen from numerous 
hard-fought political compromises. The Federalists worried that the 
political alignments that had finally produced the Constitution might 
not be replicated at a second convention.98 
When it comes to history and politics, though, McGinnis and Rap-
paport want to have their cake and eat it, too (or they want their history 
without the historicism).99 They want to claim that their reasonable-
person originalism is historically grounded. From their vantage, it is 
historically justified and specified because the evidence supposedly 
shows that, during the founding era, public meaning would have been 
discerned through such an interpretive method. Yet, McGinnis and 
 
 93. Id. at 14–41. 
 94. Resolution of Congress (Feb. 21, 1787) reprinted in Records, supra note 59, at 13, 14. 
 95. Farrand, supra note 90, at 15 (quoting Henry). 
 96. Franklin, supra note 88, at 3. 
 97. Id. at 3–5. 
 98. Pauline Maier, Ratification 67–68 (2010). 
 99. See Colby, supra note 10, at 715 (arguing that new originalists, in general, want “to 
have their cake and eat it too”). 
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Rappaport also want to invoke the reasonable person as a legal stand-
ard that filters out the messy historical contexts and leaves only the 
pure semantic constitutional meaning. Thus, McGinnis and Rap-
paport maintain that judges, by applying reasonable-person originalist 
methods, can purge discretion and politics from constitutional deci-
sion making. 
But as the historian David Fischer has explained, “historical truths 
are never pure, and rarely simple.”100 Specifically, what constitutes rea-
sonableness—or the viewpoint of a reasonable person—is not a time-
less and universal principle, but rather is the product of an array of 
specific contemporary circumstances.101 If one truly wanted to con-
struct a reasonable (or typical) person from the founding era, then pre-
sumably one would start digging into evidence about numerous actual 
people from that epoch.102 How did people relate to and interact with 
others? With family members? With strangers? How did people work? 
Were they subsistence farmers or involved in commercial transac-
tions? How were they educated? Were they literate? How important 
were religious beliefs? How about gender and race? Should the re-
searcher limit the investigation to white Protestant propertied males 
because they were the primary voters? With so many variables—and 
there are many others—the assiduous researcher would probably con-
clude that founding-era people were too diverse to be reduced into a 
hypothetical reasonable person. Any construct of a single reasonable 
person would represent a gross and misleading oversimplification. But 
suppose the researcher decided that all these variables are irrelevant. 
All that matters is how a reasonable person from the founding era un-
derstood legal documents. Nonetheless, the researcher would still 
need to dig into evidence about how people from that era actually un-
derstood legal documents. Any statements of ostensibly abstract inter-
pretive rules, wherever found (for instance, in judicial opinions, in legal 
 
 100. Fischer, supra note 80, at 40. 
 101. See Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HISTORY & 
THEORY 3, 4 (1969) (rejecting “the claim that the text itself should form the self-sufficient object 
of inquiry and understanding”). 
 102. Even Solum, who advocates for the new originalist “fixation thesis,” Solum, supra note 
2, at 4, acknowledges that “the best evidence [of conventional semantic meanings] would be the 
outcome of [a] large-scale empirical investigation of the ways that words and phrases were used 
in ordinary written and spoken English.” Id. at 10. 
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treatises, in legislative declarations, or in the debates over constitu-
tional ratification), would have to be understood within their respec-
tive political contexts: contexts that would flood the rules with subtexts 
until they washed away any abstract rules. Of course, this approach 
leads back to the complexities and indeterminacies that riddled fram-
ers’-intent (old) originalism and actual-understanding (new) original-
ism: How can originalists aggregate diverse individual views into a sin-
gle and unified constitutional meaning? 
McGinnis and Rappaport claim that they can somehow skirt these 
problems by focusing on a reasonable person applying legal interpre-
tive rules from the founding era. But if McGinnis and Rappaport de-
tach their reasonable person from actual persons (and actual under-
standings of the Constitution), where do they find evidence of their 
hypothetical person? Their reasonable person looks fictional rather 
than factual. Indeed, from this perspective, how can McGinnis and 
Rappaport claim that history fixes constitutional meaning when they 
drain historical sensibility from their interpretive method? When 
closely examined, their reasonable-person originalism devolves into an 
easily manipulated method that invites constitutional interpreters 
(such as Supreme Court justices) to project their political preferences 
into the reasonable-person construct.103 In the words of the legal his-
torian Saul Cornell, reasonable-person originalism turns “constitu-
tional interpretation into an act of historical ventriloquism.”104 The 
reasonable person is a dummy who speaks words uttered by the 
originalist scholar or judge. Instead of being grounded in history, as 
McGinnis and Rappaport claim, reasonable-person originalism runs 
aground and wrecks on the complexities of historicism.105 Like other 
 
 103. See Cornell, supra note 80, at 335 (emphasizing the danger of manipulating of evi-
dence). 
 104. Id. at 301. 
 105. Solum attempts to evade such historians’ critiques of new originalism by maintaining 
that philosophers and originalist scholars, on the one hand, and historians, on the other hand, 
conceptualize meaning differently. For this reason, according to Solum, historians’ arguments do 
not undermine the fixity of textual meaning identified by philosophers and originalist scholars. 
Solum, supra note 2, at 56–58. Solum, however, does not acknowledge that his approach invokes 
a philosophically controversial conception of language and meaning. It is not universally accepted 
in either philosophy or other fields. Daniel Levin, Book Review, 22 LAW & POLITICS BOOK REV. 
385 (2012) (reviewing ROBERT W. BENNEETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE (2011)); see HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel 
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forms of originalism, reasonable-person originalism fails to lead us to 
a fixed and objective constitutional meaning.106 
III. A History of the Reasonable Person and 
Constitutional Interpretation 
This Part examines historical evidence to show that, first, the rea-
sonable person was not an accepted legal standard at the time of the 
founding (or for many years afterward), and that, second, constitu-
tional interpretation during the founding era and subsequent decades 
was eclectic. Unsurprisingly, then, given their general failure to appre-
ciate the rich complexity of historicist thinking, McGinnis and Rap-
paport reach specific conclusions inconsistent with history. 
 
Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989) (describing textual meaning as di-
alogic and dynamic from a philosopher’s perspective); Skinner, supra note 101, at 4–6 (criticizing, 
from an intellectual historian’s perspective, the notion that a pure semantic meaning can be dis-
cerned directly from a text). 
 106. See Cross, supra note 85, at 119–94 (explaining empirical study concluding that, in 
practice, originalism does not seriously constrain justices); Bennett, supra note 7, at 107 (criti-
cizing reasonable-person originalism for assuming, without normative basis, that “language 
should be understood as used with care and consistency”). Reasonable-person originalism has 
additional problems. For instance, while the reasonable person is a familiar legal construct, at 
least nowadays, the construction of a reasonable person during the founding era requires histor-
ical research. Consequently, reasonable-person originalism, like other types of originalism, might 
ultimately make historians better than lawyers as constitutional interpreters. No less an originalist 
than Justice Scalia has admitted that originalist research might be “a task sometimes better suited 
to the historian than the lawyer.” Scalia, supra note 13, at 857. Moreover, even if the reasonable 
person is today a familiar legal construct, many critics still find it problematic. Feminists began 
criticizing the reasonable man standard in the 1970s and 1980s, until the reasonable person stand-
ard widely replaced it. Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 445, 465–67 (1997); Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 3, 20–22 (1988). Still, many criticize the reasonable person standard for a variety 
of reasons. Bernstein, supra, at 465–67; Bender, supra, at 21–24; see Kit Kinports, Criminal Proce-
dure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 71, 72–73 (2007) (noting criticisms); cf., El-
lison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878–81 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting a “reasonable woman” standard 
for statutory sexual harassment claims); Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 323 (2012) (arguing for a normative rather than positive conception of the rea-
sonable person). 
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A. Introduction to Historical Evidence 
Jurists and scholars in the latter decades of the eighteenth century 
and the early years of the nineteenth century viewed ‘reason’ as a prin-
ciple internal to the law, including natural law.107 Judges would invoke 
the faculty of reason to discern the law and guide decision-making. 
Consequently, judges would sometimes ask whether the law was rea-
sonable. Occasionally, though infrequently, a judge would invoke a 
“reasonable man” (or ‘prudent man’), but judges did not generally con-
ceive of these terms as manifesting a legal standard of judgment, liabil-
ity, or otherwise.108 
Whereas today, lawyers and judges often invoke the reasonable 
person as a generalized legal standard establishing an individual’s duty 
of care in a wide variety of circumstances, jurists during the early dec-
ades of nationhood discerned duties of care as established in the status-
relationships of the disputants.109 The common law attached a specific 
duty of care to many occupations.110 For example, innkeepers owed a 
particular duty of care to protect lodgers, while ferrymen owed a duty 
of safe transportation to travelers.111 In civil liability (tort) cases, struc-
tured around common law writs or forms of action, such as trespass or 
trespass on the case, judges (or juries) would be unlikely to conclude 
that a defendant was negligent, but might conclude that the defendant 
neglected to fulfill a duty in accordance with his distinct status.112 
Starting early in the nineteenth century and increasing during the 
middle and later decades of the century, these cases gradually trans-
formed. Judges began to invoke reason in the guise of the reasonable 
 
 107. ALAN CALNAN, A REVISITIONIST HISTORY OF TORT LAW 157, 213–18, 275 (2005); 
see STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO 
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 49–82 (2000) (discussing the importance of 
natural law during this era); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 51 
(1960) (linking “right reason” with natural law). 
 108. An online search in A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Doc-
uments and Debates, 1774-1875, uncovered no recorded instances of members of Congress using 
the terms “reasonable man” or “prudent man” during the first six congresses, running from 1789 
to 1801. 
 109. Calnan, supra note 107, at 279. 
 110. Id. at 235. 
 111. Id. at 235. 
 112. G. Edward White, The Intellectual Origins of Torts in America, 86 YALE L.J. 671, 685 
(1977). 
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or prudent man, initially in contractual cases and subsequently in tort 
cases. The growing commercialization, industrialization, and urbani-
zation of nineteenth-century American society led to increased inter-
actions among strangers and increased numbers of accidents (caused 
especially by railroads and other machines), which sparked the devel-
opment of tort law separate from contract. Judges in tort cases, then, 
began to develop a general standard of care for determining liability.113 
In both tort and criminal law, judges developed the reasonable man as 
“an objective, universally applicable standard by which everyone’s ac-
tions could be measured.”114 Thus, reasonableness—the care that a rea-
sonable or prudent man would exercise in the specific factual circum-
stances—became “an external standard of responsibility.”115 (The 
‘reasonable person’ replaced the “reasonable man” as a predominant le-
gal standard only in the late-twentieth century.116) 
To clarify, reason informed the judicially developed concept of the 
reasonable man, but the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century 
concept of reason differed from the later concept of the reasonable 
man. As will be shown in the next sections of this Article, reason was a 
general principle that permeated the legal system as a whole during the 
earlier decades, while the reasonable man became a generalized stand-
ard of liability or guilt imposed on individuals in society during the 
later decades.117 Thus, in constitutional law during early nationhood, 
jurists and scholars might invoke reason as a guide to interpretation, 
but they would not have asked how a reasonable man would have un-
derstood the constitutional text. Early judicial opinions and legal trea-
tises reveal an eclectic or pluralist approach to constitutional interpre-
tation; no single interpretive method dominated. Early judges and 
scholars invoked not only reason, but also the text, constitutional 
 
 113. Calnan, supra note 107, at 241–76; White, supra note 112, at 685–90; see E.F. Roberts, 
Negligence: Blackstone to Shaw to ? An Intellectual Escapade in a Tory Vein, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 191, 
201–04 (1965) (discussing Lemuel Shaw’s division of negligence from intentional torts). 
 114. CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 98 (1989). Given the increased de-
gree of interactions among strangers—rather than individuals in fixed-status relationships—a 
more problematic alternative approach was to assign liability (or guilt) based on an individual’s 
subjective state of mind. 
 115. Calnan, supra note 107, at 275. 
 116. Bernstein, supra note 106, at 465–67; Bender, supra note 106, at 20–22. 
 117. Calnan, supra note 107. 
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structure, framers’ intentions, original public meaning, and so on.118 
Yet, no judge or scholar maintained that constitutional meaning 
should be ascertained pursuant to a reasonable-man standard. 
B. Newspapers and the Reasonable Man 
Newspapers from the founding era reveal that “reasonable man” 
and ‘prudent man’ were commonly used figures of speech connoting a 
man of ordinary intelligence—an average man who could appreciate a 
persuasive argument. For instance, on May 16, 1786, the Daily Adver-
tiser, recounted a fable, Judges, which recommended choosing “a pru-
dent man in whom is the fear of God.”119 In the same vein, writers 
would often invoke a reasonable or prudent man as a rhetorical device 
to emphasize the acceptability of a statement or proposition. The Sa-
lem Mercury published an essay, also in 1786, discussing the expendi-
ture of tax monies. It included the following line: “[I]t must therefore 
be apparent, to every reasonable man, that the large taxes which we 
have paid have not been applied to the support of civil government.”120 
Americans used these terms so frequently that several newspapers 
ran a brief essay entitled Reasonable Man, which offered a tongue-in-
cheek definition of the concept: 
By a reasonable man, I mean him whose words, thoughts, and actions, 
are regulated in the main by reason. He is no slave to passionate hu-
mour, and distinguishes between an opinion and demonstration: he 
may lean to one side of the question, but is never positive without 
being certain; and that he is certain is no easy matter for him to be-
lieve, as he is sensible what a mixture of obscurity there is, even in 
our clearest conceptions.121 
 
 118. Cf., O’Neill, supra note 10, at 12–24 (arguing that lawyers, judges, and theorists fol-
lowed original intent originalism during early decades). 
 119. Judges, DAILY ADVERTISER, May 16, 1786, at 2. 
 120. Address to the People, SALEM MERCURY, Nov. 11, 1786, at 1. For additional invocations 
of a reasonable or prudent man, see Remarks on Manners, Government Law and Domestic Debt of 
America, PENNSYLVANIA PACKET, Feb. 21, 1787, at 2 (discussing the prudent man); Europe, Lon-
don, BOSTON GAZETTE, Sept. 13, 1784, at 2 (discussing the reasonable man); Extract of a Letter 
from Plymouth, PENNSYLVANIA MERCURY, Oct. 1, 1784, at 2 (discussing the reasonable man). 
 121. A Reasonable Man, NEW-HAMPSHIRE SPY, Nov. 14, 1786, at 1. 
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The essay then compared a reasonable man to Socrates, who real-
ized how little he knew. The reasonable man, the essay concluded, 
confesses “that he knows nothing, not even himself thoroughly.”122 
The common conception of the reasonable or prudent man as be-
ing ordinary or average was highlighted in a newspaper essay on 
friendship and the prudent man published in 1790. “The mediocrity 
of his abilities raises him above contempt; but are not so eminent as to 
excite envy. In short, he is a prudent man, who, though he may gain 
slowly upon the friendship or attachment of his acquaintance, never 
runs any risque of losing what he does gain.”123 Yet, the reasonable or 
prudent man was not always conceived of as ordinary. Often, these 
concepts were conjoined with wisdom, so an article would refer to a 
“wise and prudent” or “wise and reasonable” man. Thus, “[a] wise and 
prudent man swallows his grief and waits for the occasion.”124 Occa-
sionally, an article would maintain that reasonableness or prudence are 
all too rare, as in a 1790 Hampshire Gazette piece on taxes and national 
revenue: “[I]t is only a great and prudent man, who can combine public 
and private interests, by enriching the national treasury, in such ways 
as stimulate general industry, and overburden no order of people.”125 
As these examples demonstrate, newspapers generally did not in-
voke the reasonable or prudent man as a standard of legal judgment or 
liability. Yet, in theory, the terms could be used in such a manner, and 
while rare, a couple of suggestive though nebulous instances exist. In a 
1788 article discussing the number of years an individual should have 
resided in a state before being elected to national governmental office, 
the author wrote, “Every reasonable man must allow that seven years 
citizenship, which the constitution requires, cannot purge a man of all 
improper ingredients, as to render him a fit object of comparison with 
a native citizen.”126 While “reasonable man,” here, might be viewed as 
 
 122. Id. The essay was also published in the New-York Daily Gazette, Aug. 2, 1790, at 731; 
the Massachusetts Spy, Sept. 2, 1790, at 2; and elsewhere. 
 123. The Tablet, THE GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES, Jan. 2, 1790, at 303. 
 124. Wit, and Wisdom of the East, WEEKLY MUSEUM, Oct. 4, 1788, at 2. For additional 
examples, see Miscellany, A Crust for Your Jokers, THE ARGUS, March 2, 1792, at 2 (discussing the 
“wise and reasonable man”); Philadelphia, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, March 27, 1789, at 2 
(discussing “a wise and prudent man”); To the Inhabitants of the Town of Boston, INDEPENDENT 
CHRONICLE, May 20, 1784, at 1 (discussing “a wise and prudent man”). 
 125. The Observer, HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Feb. 24, 1790, at 1. 
 126. To the Public, CITY GAZETTE, Nov. 25, 1788, at 2. 
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a technical term connoting a legal standard, it could just as easily be 
understood in accord with its ordinary usage as a rhetorical empha-
sis.127 The second instance, from 1791, is even more obscure. In a dis-
pute over money, the author posted an advertisement stating that 
“there is no “reasonable man” would have been irritated at receiving a 
‘decent and becoming’ request of stating to the public what the amount 
of that sacred deposit was.”128 Again, too, this invocation could be read-
ily understood in accord with ordinary usage as a rhetorical emphasis. 
C. Dictionaries 
The more typical newspaper uses of “reasonable man” and ‘pru-
dent man’ correspond with contemporary dictionary definitions.129 For 
instance, Samuel Johnson’s 1786 Dictionary of the English Language pro-
vided multiple definitions of “reasonable”: “Having the faculty of rea-
son; endued with reason. . . . Acting, speaking, or thinking ration-
ally. . . . Just; rational; agreeable to reason.”130 Similarly, Nathan 
Bailey’s 1790 Universal Etymological English Dictionary defined reason-
able as “agreeable to the rules of Reason; just, right, conscionable.”131 
Bailey gave multiple definitions of “reason,” though the one that seems 
most pertinent to the conception of “reasonable” states: “thinking; that 
Faculty of the Soul whereby we judge of Things; the Exercise of that 
Faculty; Argument, Proof, Cause, Matter.”132 Meanwhile, “prudent” is 
defined as “discreet, wise managing,” and “prudence” is “wisdom in 
managing affairs.”133 
Interestingly, Bailey provided a second definition of “reasonable,” 
which would correspond closely with the only definition given in Giles 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Messrs. George Decker, Henry Stouffer, & Co., MARYLAND JOURNAL, Aug. 19, 1791, at 
4. 
 129. I do not mean to suggest that a contemporary dictionary would provide a definitive 
meaning for a word or phrase. I include this section merely to provide another source of historical 
evidence. See Cornell, supra note 80, at 298 (arguing that founding-era dictionaries “were idio-
syncratic products of their authors, who often had ideological and political agendas”). 
 130. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1786 ed.). 
 131. NATHAN BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1790 
ed.). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.; see also JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 130 
(giving similar definitions of “reasonable” and “reason”). 
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Jacob’s 1797 Law-Dictionary. “Reasonable Aid [Law Term] a Duty 
claimed, by the lord of the fee, of his tenants, by his knights service, to 
marry his daughter.”134 This definitional association of reasonableness, 
as a legal concept, with a status-based duty is typical (as will be dis-
cussed further in the section on case law).135 Perhaps, more to the 
point, Jacob’s Law-Dictionary does not contain (or define) the terms 
“reasonable man” and “prudent man” Jacob defined “reason” as being 
inherent to law, which was also fairly typical. “Reason, is the very life 
of Law; and what is contrary to it is unlawful.”136 Jacob continued in 
the same vein: “When the reason of the Law once ceases, the Law itself 
generally ceases; because Reason is the foundation of all our Laws.”137 
D. Case Law: From Reason to Reasonable Man 
In the early decades of nationhood, many Americans believed in 
natural law, which supposedly informed judicial decision making, both 
in common law and constitutional cases.138 And significantly, reason 
was considered to be inherent to natural law. In Calder v. Bull, decided 
in 1798, Justice Samuel Chase equated natural law with reason.139 He 
maintained that certain laws, such as one “that takes property from A 
and gives it to B. . . . is against all reason and justice.”140 In Fletcher v. 
Peck, decided in 1810, Justice William Johnson, concurring, relied 
even more heavily on natural law, which he equated with reason. Re-
 
 134. GILES JACOB, II THE LAW-DICTIONARY (T.E. Tomlins ed.; London 1797 ed.); see 
also Bailey, supra note 131. 
 135. See infra notes 151–54 and accompanying text. 
 136. II Jacob, supra note 134. 
 137. Id. The Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed., March 2012 online version), shows numerous 
uses of “reasonable man” prior to the founding era, but does not have one legal use until the 
twentieth century. The 1910 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary does not have an entry for “reason-
able man,” even as a sub-entry under “reasonable.” HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 994 (2d ed. 1910). Black’s also does not have “prudent man,” even as a sub-entry 
under “prudence.” Id. at 963. 
 138. See Feldman, supra note 107, at 49–82 (discussing natural law era); McCloskey, supra 
note 107, at 50–51 (discussing natural law era). 
 139.  3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 140.  Id. 
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gardless of the Constitution, he explained, he would invalidate the dis-
puted state statute “on a general principle, on the reason and nature of 
things: a principle which will impose laws even on the deity.”141 
In Calder and other cases, judges interpreted the law in accord with 
“reason and justice.”142 Chief Justice John Marshall, writing in the fa-
mous 1819 decision, McCulloch v. Maryland, invoked the “dictates of 
reason” as an interpretive guide to the Constitution.143 In discussing 
the scope of congressional power under Article III, Marshall stated: 
“The government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on 
it the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of 
reason, be allowed to select the means.”144 Justice Joseph Story ex-
plained likewise, that the Constitution “is to have a reasonable con-
struction.”145 
In several early cases, judges used the terms, “reasonable man” and 
“prudent man,” but in accordance with their common or normal us-
ages, as rhetorical devices underscoring the acceptability of a statement 
or proposition.146 The 1793 decision, Chisholm v. Georgia, illustrates 
this proposition.147 Justice James Iredell, dissenting, compared Article 
III with the Judiciary Act: 
The Constitution is particular in expressing the parties who may be 
the objects of the jurisdiction in any of these cases, but in respect to 
the subject-matter upon which such jurisdiction is to be exercised, 
uses the word ‘controversies’ only. The act of Congress more partic-
ularly mentions civil controversies, a qualification of the general 
word in the Constitution, which I do not doubt every reasonable man 
will think well warranted, for it cannot be presumed that the general 
 
 141. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 143 (1810) (Johnson, J., concurring). In Calder, Chase 
had also suggested that natural law principles alone might justify the judicial invalidation of leg-
islation. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. at 388. 
 142. Calder, 3 U.S. at 388; Wall v. Robson, 11 S.C.L. 498, 506 (Const. Ct. App. S.C. 1820); 
Sherwood v. Salmon, 5 Day 439, 445 (Conn. 1813). 
 143. McColloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 409 (1819). 
 144. Id. at 409–10. 
 145. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 326 (1816). In 1787, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania explained that a covenant should receive a “reasonable construction.” Pollard v. 
Shaffer, 1 U.S. 210, 215 (Pa. 1787). 
 146. Perronneau v. Perronneau’s Executors, 1 Des. 521, 535 (S.C. App. 1796); Martindale’s 
Lessee v. Troop, 3 H. & McH. 244, 282 (Md. Gen. 1793), reversed (no decision named) (Md. Ct. 
App. 1796); Purviance v. Angus, 1 U.S. 180, 184 (Pa. 1786). 
 147.  Chrisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
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word ‘controversies’ was intended to include any proceedings that 
relate to criminal cases, which in all instances that respect the same 
Government, only, are uniformly considered of a local nature, and to 
be decided by its particular laws.148 
Iredell, thus, did not invoke “reasonable man” as a legal standard 
that could reveal constitutional meaning. Rather, he invoked it as a 
rhetorical device akin to an exclamation mark. He intended to empha-
size that the congressional action—the statutory gloss on Article III—
would be widely acceptable. Indeed, in at least a couple of other cases 
involving statutory interpretation, judges explained that they must as-
sume that the legislators were “upright and reasonable men.”149 
Still, one might ask: During the first several decades of nation-
hood, starting in 1776, did any judicial decisions use “reasonable man” 
as a legal standard of judgment or liability? To answer this question, 
one must distinguish two types of cases. The first type of case entails 
the invocation of the reasonable or prudent man as a standard or duty 
of care that attaches to specific status-relationships or positions. The 
second type of case entails the invocation of the reasonable or prudent 
man as a generalized standard of care or liability, applicable among 
strangers or other unconnected individuals (not in a preexisting status-
relationship). 
Among the first type, status-relationship cases, an increasing num-
ber of instances arose with the turn from the eighteenth to the nine-
teenth century. A status-relationship might arise in several different 
ways. One might be born into it, as when an individual inherits real 
property and is therefore a landowner. More often, one might accept 
an appointment or otherwise voluntarily assume a professional posi-
tion or occupation, such as a sheriff, a doctor, or a ship’s captain. In 
these types of cases, regardless of how the status-relationship arose, 
courts often would invoke reason, or the concepts of reasonableness or 
prudence, to elaborate the duties attached to the particular position or 
 
 148. Id. at 431–32 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 149. Wall v. Robson, 11 S.C.L. 498, 506 (Const. Ct. App. S.C. 1820); Marshall v. Lovelass, 
1 N.C. 412, 436 (Superior Cts. of Law & Equity of N.C. 1801). 
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status.150 An early example is the 1786 case of Purviance v. Angus, in-
volving the liability of a ship’s captain for damaged goods.151 The court 
explained the captain’s duties: “Reasonable care, attention, prudence, 
and fidelity, are expected from the master of a ship, and if any misfor-
tune or mischief ensues from the want of them, either in himself or his 
mariners, he is responsible in a civil action.”152 In such cases, then, rea-
sonableness was not a generalized legal standard of duty or liability; 
rather, reason (and reasonableness) imbued the legal duties that at-
tached to specific positions, coincident to the natural law concept of 
reason, which permeated the legal system as a whole.153 
Yet, individuals might become enmeshed in status-relationships by 
another means, which became increasingly common during the early-
nineteenth century as the nation grew more commercial. Namely, two 
individuals might enter a contractual relationship with each other.154 A 
contractual relationship, of course, might involve an individual who is 
a member of a profession or similar occupation, but it might also in-
volve other individuals, neither of whom fit into such a recognized po-
sition. Over time, as judges repeatedly needed to articulate the duties 
that attached to various contractual relationships, the judges would in-
voke reason more often in the guise of the reasonable or prudent man. 
 
 150. Foster v. President of Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479, 501 (Mass. 1821) (duty of bailee); 
Barber v. Brace, 3 Conn. 9, 14 (Conn. 1819) (ship’s master); Patten v. Halsted, 1 N.J.L. 277 (N.J. 
1795) (sheriff); McClures v. Hammond, 1 Bay 99 (S.C. Com. Pl. Gen. Sess. 1790) (common 
carrier). 
 151. Purviance v. Angus, 1 U.S. 180 (Pa. Err. & App. 1786). 
 152. Id. at 185. 
 153. A noteworthy example is Case of Fries, a politically explosive treason case in which Ire-
dell, as a circuit judge, instructed the jury regarding, among other things, a marshal’s duties. 9 F. 
Cas. 826 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799). Iredell explained that the marshal “acted the part of a prudent man, 
and was justifiable in the act” of apprehending the defendant. Id. at 915. The case was entangled 
with the Federalists’ disastrous 1798 passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts; the allegedly trea-
sonous acts were in reaction against the Federalist legislation. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC 
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 695–700 (1993) (discussing the politics of the Fries case); 
Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America: A History 70–100 (2008) 
(discussing Alien and Sedition Acts). But as construed by Iredell, the case turned in part on the 
status of the marshal and the duties that attached to that status, so Iredell invoked the concept of 
prudence to explain those duties. 
 154. Cf. Calnan, supra note 107, at 231–35 (distinguishing transactional from pre-transac-
tional duties). In the United States, contract law was only developing as a separable realm in the 
early-nineteenth century. Kermit L. Hall, THE MAGIC MIRROR 119–23 (1989). In the first edi-
tion of his Commentaries, James Kent included a lecture (or chapter) on contracts. JAMES KENT, 
2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 363–436 (1827) [hereinafter 2 KENT]. 
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The only such eighteenth-century case arose in South Carolina in 
1793—after ratification of the Constitution, needless to say. The issue 
revolved around when payment was due on a promissory note. The 
judge wrote: “The great question for the jury therefore, in this case, is, 
whether a reasonable diligence has been used or not? Such as a prudent man, 
in his ordinary affairs, would observe, where his own interest only was 
immediately concerned.”155 
After 1800, similar cases arose with growing frequency. For in-
stance, an 1805 Connecticut case involved a dispute over an allegedly 
fraudulent sale of land.156 The court stated: “The law redresses those 
only who use due diligence to protect themselves, such diligence as 
prudent men ordinarily use.”157 In an 1819 South Carolina case arising 
from the sale of a horse, the judge elaborated the concept of a prudent 
man in commerce: 
By ordinary diligence, I understand that sort of care which a prudent 
man would exercise in relation to his own affairs; and to fix on that 
character, we must look through the community generally, selecting 
neither the most scrupulously diligent, nor the most negligent, and 
having thus established a standard, with a view to the habits of the 
country in which we live, I know of no other means of making the 
application, than by the self inquiry, What should I have done under 
similar circumstances?158 
The second type of case, involving the judicial invocation of the 
reasonable or prudent man as a generalized standard of care or liability, 
was exceedingly rare through the early decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury. The only such cases arose from prosecutions where courts needed 
to distinguish murder from manslaughter. In a 1797 North Carolina 
case, the judge charged the jury as follows: 
Manslaughter is where some great provocation is given, that is calcu-
lated to excite the resentment of a reasonable man to such a degree as 
to take away the proper exercise of his reason, he kills the aggressor; 
as if the aggressor spits in his face, pulls his nose, kicks him, or the 
 
 155. Hall v. Smith, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 330 (S.C. Com. Pl. Gen. Sess. 1793). 
 156.  Sherwood v. Salmon, 2 Day 128 (Conn. 1805). 
 157. Id. at 136. 
 158. La Borde v. Ingraham, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 419, 421 (1819). For additional 
examples, see McNeill v. Brooks, 9 Tenn. 73, 74 (Tenn. 1822) (contract to ride a horse); Young v. 
Cosby, 6 Ky. (1 Bibb) 227, 227 (1813) (assignment of a note). 
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like, or where blows pass; in all these cases the blood is heated and 
the passions roused or excited; and the killing under such circum-
stances, is attributed to human frailty, and not to a wickedness of 
heart.159 
The next case, a federal prosecution in Rhode Island, arose more 
than two decades later.160 It is most noteworthy because Justice Story, 
riding circuit, was the judge. Similar to the North Carolina judge, 
Story instructed the jury to decide whether the victim had inflicted 
such an injury on the defendant as “to provoke a reasonable man” to 
kill.161 In these two criminal cases, then, the juries were to determine 
the defendant’s guilt (or liability) by comparing his actions to those of 
a reasonable man. In this sense, the courts used the “reasonable man” 
as a generalized legal standard that would apply to all individuals.162 
Yet, during those early decades, up to 1825, many other courts dis-
tinguished murder from manslaughter without invoking a reasonable-
man standard. These cases typically stressed the degree of voluntari-
ness: Murder was intentional killing with “malice aforethought.”163 In 
several cases, the judge (including Story in the federal Rhode Island 
prosecution) stated that manslaughter was homicide in response to a 
 
 159. State v. Weaver, 3 N.C. 54 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1797) (emphasis added). 
 160.  United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 646 (C.C. D. R.I. 1819). 
 161. Id. at 649. Story wrote: 
These are the material principles of law, which I deem it necessary to bring to the 
consideration of the jury. If upon weighing the facts they are satisfied that there was 
not a reasonable provocation in the present case, but that it was slight, and the pun-
ishment utterly disproportioned to the offence; if they are satisfied that the party was 
stimulated by a malignant spirit of revenge, and diabolical fury, and sought the life of 
the deceased with brutal passion, having received no injury that ought to provoke a 
reasonable man to such an act, then the prisoner is guilty of murder—if otherwise, then 
he is guilty of manslaughter only. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 162. In one other case, the judge appeared to obscurely refer to a reasonable man as a means 
of determining land ownership. The judge stated “that to constitute a legal settlement, it must 
be accompanied with personal residence, unless such danger exists, as would operate on the mind 
of a man of reasonable firmness.” M’Laughlin’s Lessee v. Dawson, 4 U.S. 221, 221–22 (Pa. 1800). 
Also, John Marshall, as the attorney for a client in a 1786 Virginia land dispute, apparently used 
“prudent man” as a legal standard in his argument to the court. Hite v. Fairfax, 4 Call 42, 73–74 
(Va. 1786). 
 163. State v. Roberts, 8 N.C. 349 (1821); Definition of Indictable Crimes, 2 Del. Cas. 235 
(1797). For additional examples, see Lee v. Woolsey, 19 Johns 319 (1822); State v. Pompey, 2 
Del. Cas. 113 (1798); State v. Norris, 2 N.C. 429 (1796). 
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“reasonable provocation.”164 Nevertheless, the crucial point to recog-
nize is that, over and over again, courts needed to distinguish murder 
from manslaughter, but in doing so, judges relied on a reasonable-man 
standard only twice, during more than four decades of decision mak-
ing. 
In sum, one can fairly conclude that early courts invoked the rea-
sonable or prudent man as a generalized legal standard rarely and even 
anomalously. Instead, the judicial invocation of the reasonable or pru-
dent man became increasingly common in contractual cases. With 
growing frequency, judges would conceptualize specific contractual 
duties as requiring due diligence, which equated with the actions of a 
reasonable or prudent man. Then, from the 1820s to the 1850s, as tort 
law gradually separated from contract law, the concept of the reason-
able or prudent man slowly emerged as a generalized standard of care 
or liability that would govern interactions among strangers.165 An early 
example arose in a Vermont appellate case from 1824.166 A collision 
between two horses and wagons killed one of the horses, whose owner 
sued for negligence (or action on the case for negligence—to use the 
terminology of the common law writs). The appellate court described 
the jury instructions as follows: 
[I]f the Jury found from the evidence before them, that the defendant 
did not use common care and diligence, in the management of his 
horse and wagon, at the time the injury happened, they would find 
 
 164. State v. Zellers, 7 N.J.L. 220 (1824) (in jury instructions); Commonwealth v. Gable, 7 
Serg. & Rawle 423 (Pa. 1821) (Gibson, J., dissenting); United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 646, 
649 (C.C. D. R.I. 1819) (Story, J.); United States v. Travers, 28 F. Cas. 204 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) 
(Story, J.). Neither Tucker’s Blackstone nor Kent’s Commentaries invoked the reasonable or pru-
dent man as a standard distinguishing murder from manslaughter. JAMES KENT, 1 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 316 (1826) [hereinafter 1 KENT]; ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 
5 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION 
AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 190–91 (1803); see 2 KENT, supra note 154, at 12 (stating that 
the distinction between murder and manslaughter “does not belong to my present purpose to 
examine”). 
 165. Hall, supra note 155, at 123–26; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 85–89 (1977). 
 166.  Washburn v. Tracy, 2 D. Chip. 128 (Vt. 1824). 
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for the plaintiff the value, &c.—If on the other hand, the Jury con-
sidered the defendant did use such care and diligence, as prudent men 
generally use, they would find for the defendant.167 
The court apparently found this instruction unobjectionable, but 
nonetheless reversed because the trial judge failed to add an instruc-
tion concerning contributory negligence.168 
In fact, previous historical studies have concluded that the reason-
able-man standard first appeared in an 1837 English case, Vaughan v. 
Menlove,169 and was not incorporated into American law until later in 
the nineteenth century.170 And to be sure, by the 1850s, the “reasonable 
man” had solidified as a standard in American law: An individual de-
fendant, in a civil tort action or criminal prosecution, would be judged 
in comparison to the hypothesized actions of an ordinary or average 
man in the same circumstances. In an 1857 tort case involving an acci-
dent at a train crossing, the renowned Lemuel Shaw approved a jury 
instruction that explained the plaintiff’s burden in proving that the de-
fendant railroad was “guilty of negligence.”171 The plaintiff, Shaw 
wrote, “must prove want of ordinary and reasonable care, by omitting 
such warnings and precautions as persons of ordinary care, under like 
circumstances, would and ought to use.”172 A Michigan homicide case, 
decided five years later, applied a similar standard: “In determining 
whether the provocation is sufficient or reasonable, ordinary human 
nature, or the average of men recognized as men of fair average mind 
and disposition, should be taken as the standard.”173 
E. Case Law: On Constitutional Interpretation 
An examination of early Supreme Court constitutional cases re-
veals the justices invoking a wide variety of interpretive guides. In the 
 
 167. Id. at 135. 
 168. Id. at 135–36. 
 169.  Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837). 
 170. E.g., Gillespie, supra note 114, at 98; Mark A. Rothstein, Legal Conceptions of Equality 
in the Genomic Age, 25 LAW & INEQ. 429, 436 (2007); Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, History and 
the Legal Process: A Profile of the “Reasonable Man”, 8 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 311, 312–13 (1977). 
 171. Shaw v. Bos. & Worcester R.R. Corp., 74 Mass. 45, 60 (1857). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 221 (1862). But cf. People v. Woods, 331 N.W.2d 707 
(Mich. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1134 (1983) (different standard is now used). 
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1793 Chisholm v. Georgia decision, the issue was whether Article III 
allowed a citizen of one state to sue another state in federal court.174 
The case might be viewed not only as the Court’s first constitutional 
decision but also as the Court’s first foray into a volatile political con-
troversy. The underlying political issues were twofold: First, the case 
rekindled Anti-federalist fears that the new centralized government 
would overwhelm state sovereignty, and second, the case, if decided 
against Georgia, might cause creditors to stampede into federal court 
suing state governments for large sums of money.175 The Court, with 
opinions delivered seriatim, held that the state was unprotected by sov-
ereign immunity and, therefore, subject to suit.176 In so deciding, the 
Court buttressed national power at the expense of state sovereignty. 
The ensuing political uproar was so deafening that the Eleventh 
Amendment, prohibiting similar suits, was proposed almost immedi-
ately and ratified within two years.177 
The multiple opinions in Chisholm show numerous interpretive ap-
proaches. Several justices appear to refer to the public meaning of the 
text, as discerned in various ways. For instance, the lone dissenter, Ire-
dell, stated that the Constitution should have a “fair construction,”178 
such that “every word in the Constitution may have its full effect.”179 
All of the justices in the majority appear to suggest that the text has a 
plain (public) meaning.180 Justice William Cushing, for instance, rea-
soned that the case “seems clearly to fall within the letter of the Con-
stitution.”181 Justice James Wilson, the most sophisticated legal scholar 
on the Court, inquired into the public meaning based on the people’s 
intentions, while also suggesting the text had a plain meaning.182 Chief 
Justice John Jay, after declaring that he would look to the Constitu-
tion’s “letter and express declaration,”183 explained that meaning is 
 
 174.  Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 175. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 107, at 34–35. 
 176. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (Dall.) at 479. 
 177. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 20–22 (1993). 
 178. Chrisholm, 2 U.S. (Dall.) at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
 179. Id. at 450 (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
 180. E.g., id. at 450 (opinion of Blair, J.). 
 181. Id. at 467 (opinion of Cushing, J.). 
 182. Id. at 464–66 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
 183. Id. at 473 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
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based on “ordinary and common” usage,184 though he then suggested 
that congressional understanding and action manifested such usage.185 
If one were to focus solely on these multiple emphases on the Con-
stitution’s public and plain meaning, one could readily conclude that 
the justices followed a new originalist interpretive method. Such a con-
clusion, however, would be mistaken. At least two justices, and maybe 
a third, looked elsewhere in their efforts to ascertain constitutional 
meaning. Both Wilson and Jay stressed that the Constitution’s under-
lying purposes should inform its interpretation. Both justices drew, in 
particular, on the preamble’s “declared objects” or purposes.186 Thus, 
Wilson reasoned that the Court should interpret the Constitution to 
further such purposes: “to form an union more perfect[,] . . . ‘to estab-
lish justice[, and]’ . . . ‘to ensure domestic tranquility.’”187 Likewise, Jay 
explained that because he was obliged to attend to “the design of the 
Constitution,”188 he must therefore construe Article III in light of the 
injunction “to establish justice.”189 
Wilson also mentioned “the general texture of the Constitution,” 
suggesting an attention to the fabric of the whole—the location of a 
particular provision relative to other provisions.190 Jay, interestingly, 
emphasized the advantageous practical consequences of allowing states 
to be sued.191 The extension of the federal judicial power “to such con-
troversies, appears to me to be wise, because it is honest, and because 
it is useful. . . . It is useful . . . because it leaves not even the most 
obscure and friendless citizen without means of obtaining justice from 
a neighbouring State.”192 Jay continued by listing four more favorable 
consequences.193 Meanwhile, Iredell suggested, albeit ambiguously, 
that the framers’ intentions might be relevant, writing, “The framers 
of the Constitution, I presume, must have meant one of two things.”194 
 
 184. Id. at 477 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
 185. Id. at 477 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
 186. Id. at 465 (opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 474–75 (Jay, C.J.). 
 187. Id. at 465 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
 188. Id. at 473 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
 189. Id. at 475–76 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
 190. Id. at 465 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
 191.  Id. at 472 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
 192. Id. at 479 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
 193. Id. at 479 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
 194. Id. at 432 (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
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A 1796 decision, Hylton v. United States, again raised (implicitly) 
the crucial issue of the scope of national power vis-à-vis the states. The 
case focused specifically on the congressional authority to tax,195 and 
once more, the justices favored federal power. The Court held that a 
congressional tax on carriages did not constitute a “direct” tax under 
Article I, and that, therefore, the constitutional requirement of appor-
tionment (among the states per their populations) did not apply.196 
Three justices, Chase, William Paterson, and Iredell, issued seriatim 
opinions. All of them relied to some degree on the public or plain 
meaning of the constitutional text, yet all of them also considered ad-
ditional interpretive guides. Chase, writing the first opinion, began by 
asserting: “I am inclined to think, that a tax on carriages is not a direct 
tax, within the letter, or meaning, of the Constitution.”197 But Chase 
continued by emphasizing the practical consequences of his interpre-
tive glean on the Constitution’s tax clauses. “It appears to me, that a 
tax on carriages cannot be laid by the rule of apportionment, without 
very great inequality and injustice.”198 To hammer home the inequality 
in concrete terms, Chase compared two states, computing the amounts 
in dollars that each would owe if apportionment were required. Iredell 
and Paterson also contemplated practical consequences. Like Chase, 
Iredell considered the effects of an apportionment rule and showed his 
calculations in dollars.199 Iredell concluded: “This mode [of taxation] 
is too manifestly absurd to be supported.”200 Both Iredell and Paterson 
also considered the practical consequences of an alternative tax scheme 
proposed by one of the parties. Paterson found it “utterly impractica-
ble,”201 while Iredell feared it had “dangerous consequences.”202 
Paterson’s opinion is worth spotlighting because of how he further 
delved into constitutional meaning. After he considered public mean-
ing—concluding that “the natural and common, or technical and ap-
propriate, meaning of the [constitutional] words” were not “clear and 
 
 195. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
 196. Art. I, §2, cl. 3; Art. I, §8, cl. 1; Art. I, §9, cl. 4. 
 197.  Hylton, 3 U.S. at 173 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 198. Id. at 174 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 199. Id. at 181–82 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 200. Id. at 182 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 201. Id. at 179 (opinion of Paterson, J.). 
 202. Id. at 183 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
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precise”—Paterson entered into an extensive exploration of the fram-
ers’ intentions.203 First, he examined Congress’s taxing power in gen-
eral. “It was . . . obviously the intention of the framers of the Consti-
tution, that Congress should possess full power over every species of 
taxable property, except exports.”204 Next, Paterson specifically ex-
plored what “the framers of the Constitution contemplated as falling 
within the rule of apportionment.”205 His analysis of this (recent) his-
tory led him to emphasize the political interests at stake during the 
Philadelphia convention. In particular, the “southern states,” because 
they “possessed a large number of slaves,” worried that other states 
would act through Congress to tax them unfairly.206 “To guard them 
against imposition in these particulars, was the reason of introducing 
the clause in the Constitution, which directs that representatives and 
direct taxes shall be apportioned among the states, according to their 
respective numbers.”207 Paterson stressed, in other words, that the var-
ious constitutional tax clauses were “the work of [political] compro-
mise.”208 From his vantage, however, the “sacrifices and concessions” 
of the non-southern states were “radically wrong.”209 Based on this po-
litical history, Paterson shaped an interpretive conclusion: “The rule 
[of apportionment], therefore, ought not to be extended by construc-
tion.”210 This extraordinary passage bears reiteration: Paterson re-
viewed part of the framing history, recognized the tax apportionment 
clauses as arising from a political compromise, denounced the sub-
stance of the compromise, and therefore maintained that the Court 
should strictly or narrowly interpret the apportionment clauses. Pater-
son was not finished, though. After examining the pre-constitutional 
history of the 1780s as well as the practical consequences of the pro-
posed alternative tax scheme, Paterson added a flourish: “I shall close 
the discourse with reading a passage or two from [Adam] Smith’s 
 
 203. Id. at 176 (opinion of Paterson, J.). 
 204. Id. at 176 (opinion of Paterson, J.). 
 205. Id. at 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.). 
 206. Id. at 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.). 
 207. Id. (opinion of Paterson, J.). 
 208. Id. at 178 (opinion of Paterson, J.). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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Wealth of Nations.”211 He quoted two long passages from Smith on 
methods of taxation, thus implying that Smith’s observations informed 
Paterson’s interpretation of the Constitution’s tax clauses.212 
The issue in the 1798 Calder v. Bull case was whether Article I, 
Section 10, Clause 1, which prohibits states from enacting ex post facto 
laws, precluded the Connecticut legislature from passing a resolution 
that set aside a judicial decree in a probate dispute. This time, the 
Court preserved a degree of state sovereignty by unanimously holding, 
with seriatim opinions, that the constitutional prohibition applied only 
to criminal laws and thus was inapposite to the legislative resolution.213 
Chase’s discussion of interpretive methods was most interesting. Like 
the justices in Chisholm, Chase looked to public meaning, referring to 
“the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the [ex post facto] 
prohibition.”214 But to discern such meaning, Chase examined how 
both Blackstone and “the author of the Federalist [Papers]” used the 
phrase, ex post facto (remember, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay first 
published the essays of the Federalist Papers in New York newspapers 
during the debate over ratification).215 Chase, moreover, considered 
other factors relevant to constitutional interpretation. He contem-
plated the practical consequences that would follow from including 
civil as well as criminal laws within the ambit of the ex post facto clause: 
“If the term ex post facto law is to be construed to include and to pro-
hibit the enacting any law after a fact, it will greatly restrict the power 
of the federal and state legislatures; and the consequences of such a 
construction may not be foreseen.”216 And Chase, as mentioned in the 
previous section, also accentuated natural law. After equating natural 
law with reason, he suggested that the Constitution should be inter-
preted in accord with natural law principles.217 Yet, it should be noted, 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
 214. Id. at 390 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 215. Id. at 391 (stylistic changes added). Justice William Paterson, also looking to public 
meaning, examined Blackstone and the use of the phrase, ex post facto, in state constitutions. Id. 
at 396–97 (opinion of Paterson, J.). On the Federalist Papers, see MAIER, supra note 98, at 84. 
 216. Id. at 393 (opinion of Chase, J.) (stylistic changes added). 
 217. Id. at 388. Chase added: “An act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary 
to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of 
legislative authority.” Id. (stylistic changes added). This passage at least suggests that natural law 
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Iredell, for one, was skeptical about relying on such principles as the 
basis for judicial decision making.218 
Despite Iredell, natural law was widely accepted at the time, so jus-
tices in other cases unsurprisingly referred to it.219 In Fletcher v. Peck, 
not only did Johnson’s concurrence invoke natural law, as discussed 
earlier, but Marshall’s majority opinion did so as well. Fletcher involved 
a state legislative land grant. After the grant, when accusations of fraud 
(the bribing of legislators) surfaced, a subsequent legislature passed a 
law withdrawing the grant. The issue was whether the contract clause, 
Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, precluded the second legislative action 
as a “Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”220 The Court held 
the withdrawal legislation unconstitutional.221 By assuming that it had 
the power to invalidate state law, the Court invigorated national power 
and underscored that the Constitution had carved away aspects of state 
sovereignty.222 Marshall extensively discussed natural law,223 and main-
tained that the Court should interpret the contract clause harmoni-
ously with natural law principles, those “general principles which are 
common to our free institutions.”224 But neither Marshall nor Johnson 
limited himself to a focus on natural law. Marshall also discussed the 
Constitution’s public meaning, looking “to the natural meaning of 
words,”225 while Johnson appeared to imbue the framers’ intentions, as 
reflected in the Federalist Papers, with importance.226 
One remarkable case, Ogden v. Saunders,227 decided in 1827, deep 
into the Marshall Court era, and long after the justices had abandoned 
 
principles alone might justify the judicial invalidation of legislation. 
 218. Id. at 398–99 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 219. See FELDMAN, supra note 107 (discussing natural law era); MCCLOSKEY, supra note 
107, at 50–51 (same). 
 220. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1. 
 221. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
 222. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 107, at 52–53; SCHWARTZ, supra note 177, at 43–44. 
 223. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 133–35. 
 224. Id. at 139; see MCCLOSKEY, supra note 107, at 50–51 (discussing Marshall’s invocation 
of natural law). 
 225. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 138. 
 226. Johnson wrote: “There is reason to believe, from the letters of Publius, which are well 
known to be entitled to the highest respect, that the object of the convention was to afford a 
general protection to individual rights against the acts of the state legislatures.” Id. at 144 (John-
son, J., concurring). 
 227. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). 
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the English practice of issuing seriatim opinions,228 nicely illustrates 
not only that the justices, as a group, used a wide variety of interpretive 
approaches, but also that individual justices applied multiple interpre-
tive strategies. The majority held that the congressional bankruptcy 
power, under Article I, Section 8, Clause 4,229 was not exclusive, and 
that a state bankruptcy statute did not violate the contract clause so 
long as it applied to contracts entered subsequently to the legislative 
enactment.230 What rendered the case extraordinary was that the jus-
tices issued five opinions: one each by the four majority justices, John-
son, Robert Trimble, Smith Thompson, and Bushrod Washington, 
and one by the dissenting Marshall, joined by Gabriel Duvall and Jo-
seph Story.231 Thus, partly because they were so closely divided, the 
justices momentarily returned to the seriatim approach. Given that the 
Marshall Court decided most significant cases unanimously, with Mar-
shall writing the Court’s opinions, this case provides a rare view into 
the interpretive approaches of the respective justices.232 
Justices Johnson and Trimble invoked public meaning, based on 
how the people actually understood the Constitution.233 Johnson, for 
instance, emphasized “the sense put upon [the Constitution] by the 
people when it was adopted by them.”234 Both justices believed that 
contemporary constructions of the document provided the best evi-
dence of public meaning. Johnson gleaned such evidence from legisla-
tive actions taken after ratification,235 while Trimble quoted from the 
Federalist Papers to illustrate “the contemporary construction” given 
 
 228. SCHWARTZ, supra note 177, at 20, 39. 
 229.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 230. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). 
 231. In fact, after re-argument, Johnson issued yet another opinion on an additional issue. 
Id. at 358 (opinion of Johnson, J.). 
 232. “For the first and only time in his career Marshall had been unable to forge a majority 
in a constitutional case.” WHITE, supra note 85, at 651; see SCHWARTZ, supra note 177, at 39 
(discussing how the Marshall Court usually avoided seriatim opinions). 
 233. Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 278–79, 290 (opinion of Johnson, J.); id. at 329 (opinion 
of Trimble, J.). 
 234. Id. at 290 (opinion of Johnson, J.). Trimble wrote: “I suppose this was the understand-
ing of the American people when they adopted the constitution.” Id. at 329 (opinion of Trimble, 
J.). 
 235. Id. at 290 (opinion of Johnson, J.). 
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during the ratification process.236 Johnson explained that “the cotem-
poraries of the constitution have claims to our deference on the ques-
tion of right, because they had the best opportunities of informing 
themselves of the understanding of the framers of the constitution, and 
of the sense put upon it by the people when it was adopted by them.”237 
Apparently consistent with a public meaning approach, two jus-
tices, Johnson as well as Thompson, suggested that some constitu-
tional provisions had a plain meaning.238 Thompson, for example, 
wrote: “If this provision in the constitution was unambiguous, and its 
meaning entirely free from doubt, there would be no door left open 
for construction.”239 He then referred to “the plain and natural inter-
pretation” of the contract clause.240 Reasoning inversely, so to speak, 
Johnson found it significant that “nothing . . . on the face of the Con-
stitution” directly prohibited states from enacting bankruptcy laws.241 
Justice Washington emphasized the textual arrangement of the words 
within particular provisions.242 Johnson and Trimble also thought that 
the fabric of the whole Constitution was relevant to interpretation.243 
“The principle,” Trimble wrote, “that the association of one clause 
with another of like kind, may aid in its construction, is deemed 
sound.”244 
Four justices—Washington, Johnson, Thompson, and Trimble—
relied on the framers’ intentions.245 Trimble referred to the framers as 
“sages,”246 while Washington wrote: “I have examined both sides of 
this great question with the most sedulous care, and the most anxious 
desire to discover which of them, when adopted, would be most likely 
 
 236. Id. at 329 (opinion of Trimble, J.). 
 237. Id. at 290 (opinion of Johnson, J.). 
 238. Id. at 274–75 (opinion of Johnson, J.); id. at 302–03 (opinion of Thompson, J.). 
 239. Id. at 302 (opinion of Thompson, J.). 
 240. Id. at 303. 
 241. Id. at 274–75 (opinion of Johnson, J.). 
 242. Id. at 267–68 (opinion of Washington, J.). 
 243. Id. at 275, 288–89 (opinion of Johnson, J.); id. at 329–31 (opinion of Trimble, J.). 
 244. Id. at 329 (opinion of Trimble, J.). In a different case, Marshall, too, found the fabric 
of the whole significant. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
 245. Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 256, 258 (opinion of Washington, J.); id. at 274–75, 280 
(opinion of Johnson, J.); id. at 302–05 (opinion of Thompson, J.); id. at 329, 331 (opinion of 
Trimble, J.). 
 246. Id. at 331 (opinion of Trimble, J.). 
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to fulfil the intentions of those who framed the constitution of the 
United States.”247 Related to framers’ intentions, Washington and 
Johnson believed that the Constitution’s overall purposes should in-
form its interpretation,248 while Thompson considered “the reason and 
policy” of particular provisions to be relevant.249 
Three justices, Washington, Johnson, and Thompson, suggested 
that natural law principles should inform constitutional interpreta-
tion.250 Two justices, Johnson and Marshall (dissenting), reasoned that 
the history of the political problems that provoked the Philadelphia 
convention was germane to constitutional interpretation.251 Marshall, 
for instance, emphasized that state government corruption in the 
1780s produced unjust debtor relief laws, which engendered the inclu-
sion of the contracts clause in the Constitution.252 Two justices, John-
son and Thompson, believed that the justices could legitimately con-
sider practical consequences when interpreting the Constitution.253 At 
one point, when considering what constituted an “obligation” under 
the contracts clause, Thompson contemplated whether a particular in-
terpretation would “facilitate commercial intercourse.”254 Finally, two 
justices, Johnson and Thompson, examined judicial precedents con-
cerning disputed constitutional meanings.255 Thompson, for instance, 
considered prior state court interpretations of the contract clause to be 
relevant.256 
 
 247. Id. at 256 (opinion of Washington, J.). 
 248. Id. at 265; id. at 274 (opinion of Johnson, J.). 
 249. Id. at 303 (opinion of Thompson, J.). 
 250. Id. at 258, 266 (opinion of Washington, J.); id. at 282 (opinion of Johnson, J.); id. at 
303–04 (opinion of Thompson, J.). 
 251. Id. at 274, 276–77 (opinion of Johnson, J.); id. at 339, 354–55 (Marshall, C.J., dissent-
ing). 
 252. Id. at 354–55 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). 
 253. Id. at 276 (opinion of Johnson, J.); id. at 300, 313 (opinion of Thompson, J.). 
 254. Id. at 300 (opinion of Thompson, J.). The judicial promotion of commercial progress 
became increasingly important during the nineteenth century. Feldman, supra note 107, at 74–
82. 
 255. Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 272 (opinion of Johnson, J.); id. at 296 (opinion of 
Thompson, J.). 
 256. Id. at 296 (opinion of Thompson, J.); see id. at 272 (opinion of Johnson, J.) (discussing 
Supreme Court precedents vis-à-vis state power to pass bankruptcy laws). 
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In sum, the five justices writing opinions in Ogden employed a diz-
zying array of interpretive strategies. No justice relied on only one ex-
clusive interpretive approach, whether public meaning or otherwise. 
Every justice used multiple approaches. Justice Washington explicitly 
admitted that, in his view, constitutional interpretation was not me-
chanical, and constitutional meaning was not objective and determi-
nate. He explained his interpretive judgment: 
I should be disingenous were I to declare, from this place, that I em-
brace [a particular interpretation of the contract clause] without hes-
itation, and without a doubt of its correctness. The most that candour 
will permit me to say upon the subject is, that I see, or think I see, my 
way more clear on the side which my judgment leads me to adopt, 
than on the other, and it must remain for others to decide whether 
the guide I have chosen has been a safe one or not.257 
To be sure, the justices in Ogden as well as earlier constitutional 
cases often considered the public meaning of the Constitution. Even 
so, rather than supporting new originalism, these early judicial analyses 
of public meaning, when carefully reviewed in context, critically un-
dermine new originalist claims. In most instances when justices con-
sidered public meaning relevant to constitutional interpretation, they 
nonetheless moved on to consider additional interpretive sources. In 
so doing, the justices effectively repudiated new originalist methodol-
ogy. The gist of most new originalisms is that the preferred originalist 
method provides the exclusive interpretive path to constitutional 
meaning.258 Originalist methodology exhausts constitutional meaning, 
leaving no room for additional interpretive methods. McGinnis and 
Rappaport, in particular, emphasize that reasonable-person original-
ism rejects more eclectic or pluralist approaches to interpretation, 
 
 257. Id. at 256 (opinion of Washington, J.). Washington added that if the justices were 
doubtful about constitutional meaning, then they should defer to the legislative judgment, id. at 
270, a viewpoint that James Thayer would famously advocate more than sixty years later. James 
B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 
129 (1893). 
 258. To a degree, this is true even of a “living originalist,” like Balkin. Balkin, supra note 
64, at 3–4. He distinguishes constitutional construction from interpretation; only the latter sup-
posedly uncovers constitutional meaning. Id. at 5–6, 12–13. Thus, apparently, the more open-
ended (or living) part of his originalism is, technically, not interpretation. But see id. at 5 (explain-
ing that he will usually refer to both interpretation and construction as “‘interpretation’ gener-
ally”). 
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which they fear might sneak in the back door under the conceptual 
cloak of constitutional construction.259 Only originalist methods, it is 
claimed, lead to fixed and objective constitutional meanings. But an 
eclectic interpreter, unlike an originalist, does not claim such exclusiv-
ity of method. The eclecticist is open to multiple interpretive ap-
proaches, including an inquiry into public meaning, but also others, 
such as an examination of framers’ intentions, practical consequences, 
and so forth. Thus, when the early justices examined public meaning 
and then moved on to additional interpretive sources, they implicitly 
rejected new originalism. By consensus of their practices, the justices 
agreed on and implemented an interpretive eclecticism. True, they 
readily considered public meaning, but they did not find that it ex-
hausted constitutional meaning. 
F. Legal Treatises 
In the early 1790s, James Wilson struck a keynote in his seminal 
lectures on law by linking reason and natural law.260 Then, in the first 
great comprehensive treatise on American law, James Kent elaborated 
this link and tied it to the common law: 
A great proportion of the rules and maxims which constitute the im-
mense code of the common law grew into use by gradual adoption, 
and received, from time to time, the sanction of the courts of justice, 
without any legislative act or interference. It was the application of 
the dictates of natural justice and of cultivated reason to particular 
cases.261 
Indeed, numerous treatise writers, before and after Kent, pro-
claimed that the common law was scientific precisely because it was a 
rational system of principles.262 Reason was inherent to the common 
law system and crucial to judicial decision making. In a 1795 treatise 
on Connecticut state law, Zephaniah Swift explained that the common 
 
 259. Methods, supra note 10, at 773. 
 260. JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 123–25, 145 (1967 ed.); see 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2–9 (1st ed. 1765-
1769) (linking natural law and reason); White, supra note 85, at 129. 
 261. 1 KENT, supra note 164, at 439; see also id. at 2 (discussing the law of nations). 
 262. ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, 1 A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 
39 (1795). 
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law is binding “where it is founded in reason, and consonant to the 
genius and manners of the people.”263 In his Course of Legal Study, Da-
vid Hoffman’s pronouncement was even more rhapsodic: “If law be a 
science and really deserve so sublime a name, it must be founded on 
principle, and claim an exalted rank in the empire of reason.”264 
Treatise writers discerned numerous important ramifications from 
the reason or rationality of natural law. Francis Hilliard, for example, 
explicitly recommended that any judge, confronting ambiguity, should 
take “for his guide the universal law of reason and justice.”265 Nathaniel 
Chipman, in his Sketches of the Principles of Government, published in 
1793, emphasized that “the constitutional principles of government 
[were] founded in the principles of natural law.”266 Meanwhile, alt-
hough the nation lacked a hereditary aristocracy, many Americans per-
ceived a natural order within society.267 In this vein, the common law 
imposed obligations that appeared to arise naturally from one’s status 
within society. According to Jesse Root, writing in 1798: 
[The common law] taught the dignity, the character, the rights and 
duties of man, his rank and station here and his relation to futurity 
[and thus] defines the obligations and duties between husbands and 
wives, parents and children, brothers and sisters, between the rulers 
and the people, and the people or citizens towards each other.268 
Despite the widespread linking of reason, natural law, and the 
common law in American treatises from the early decades of nation-
hood, one can search in vain for invocations of a “reasonable man” as 
a generalized legal standard of liability or judgment. The first edition 
of Kent’s Commentaries on American Law, published from 1826 to 1830, 
did not contain the terms reasonable man, prudent man, or ordinary 
 
 263. Id. at 42–43. 
 264. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 25 (2d ed. 1846); see David Hoffman, 
A Lecture, Introductory to a Course of Lectures (1823), reprinted in THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA 
83, 85 (Perry Miller ed., 1962) (discussing legal science). 
 265. FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW 3 (1835). 
 266. NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 115 
(1793); see id. at 118, 280 (making similar statements). 
 267. DOUGLAS T. MILLER, THE BIRTH OF MODERN AMERICA 1820-1850, at 117–25 
(1970); White, supra note 85, at 18–20. 
 268. Jesse Root, The Origin of Government and Laws in Connecticut (1798), reprinted in THE 
LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA 31, 35–36 (Perry Miller ed., 1962). 
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man.269 To be sure, the reasonable or prudent man would become 
manifest in subsequent editions of the Commentaries. In the twelfth 
edition, published in 1873, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., writing as the 
editor, included a lengthy footnote when discussing duties for bail-
ments of goods. Holmes explained that if there were no other duties 
imposed—for instance, by custom or statute—then the “standard” or 
“ground of liability” should be “the conduct of a prudent man,” re-
gardless of whether the case was tried to a judge or jury.270 Holmes 
added that “liability does not necessarily depend on culpability, but of-
ten simply on the bringing about, or permitting to come to pass, cer-
tain external facts.”271 
Holmes is famous for advocating for an objective legal standard in 
torts and other common law cases. Throughout his book, The Common 
Law, published in 1881, he argued that the reasonable or prudent man 
should become (and, in many instances, was already) a near-universal 
objective standard, applicable in torts, criminal law, contracts, and so 
on.272 In Holmes’s Commentaries footnote, he cited repeatedly to his 
essay, The Theory of Torts, published the same year as the twelfth edi-
tion. In the essay, Holmes unequivocally rejected the idea that negli-
gence should be based on “culpability,” arising from “the state of the 
party’s mind.”273 In a jury trial, Holmes explained, the jury represents 
“the average opinion of the community” and thus fixes the appropriate 
“standard of conduct.”274 Ultimately, Holmes concluded, the jury must 
decide whether the defendant’s “conduct was not that of a prudent 
man.”275 Yet, despite Holmes’s eventual renown vis-à-vis the objective 
reasonable-man standard, his views were consistent with those of many 
of his contemporaries.276 In other words, while treatise writers in the 
 
 269. Kent’s first edition did not discuss negligence qua negligence. 
 270. JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 766–67 n.1 (12th ed. 1873). 
 271. Id. Holmes’s footnote might be considered consistent with the status-relationship 
cases from earlier in the nineteenth century. See supra notes 150–158 and accompanying text. But 
he clearly expanded on the applicability of the reasonable or prudent man in subsequent writings. 
See infra notes 272–277 and accompanying text. 
 272. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 38, 49–51, 108–13 (1881). 
 273. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 653 (1873). 
 274. Id. at 655. 
 275. Id. 
 276. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 
115–16 (1992). 
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early-nineteenth century did not invoke the reasonable or prudent man 
as a legal standard, by mid- to late-century, this approach would be-
come common.277 
Treatise writers from the early decades who expressly discussed 
constitutional interpretation often articulated nebulous and even in-
consistent views. They ultimately, then, appeared to implicitly adopt 
an eclectic approach.278 In the first edition of his Commentaries, Kent 
stated that the constitutionality of legislative actions should be deter-
mined in accord with “the true intent and meaning of the constitu-
tion,” which at least suggested a somewhat mechanical approach fo-
cused on text and intent.279 But two sentences later, he explicitly 
elaborated: “The interpretation or construction of the constitution . . . 
requires the exercise of the same legal discretion, as the interpretation 
or construction of a law.”280 Kent’s reference to the interpretation of 
“a law” might refer to statutory law, but it might also refer to the com-
mon law.281 When discussing statutory interpretation, Kent first em-
phasized the overriding importance of “the intention of the law-
giver,”282 but then explained that legislative intent could be gleaned 
from a variety of sources, including “context” as well as “what is con-
sonant to reason and good discretion.”283 Likewise, Kent explained that 
 
 277. In the eleventh edition of Kent’s Commentaries, published immediately after the Civil 
War, the editor, George F. Comstock, did not include Holmes’s footnote arguing that the pru-
dent man established a standard of liability. JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN 
LAW 751 (11th ed. 1866–1867). Nonetheless, Comstock elsewhere invoked a prudent-man stand-
ard. For instance, when citing an English case, Comstock explained that “the negligence on the 
part of the guest was defined to be such, that the loss would not have happened, if the guest had 
used the ordinary care that a prudent man might be reasonably expected to have taken under the 
circumstances.” Id. at 787 n.1. Comstock’s invocation of the prudent man, of course, might be 
considered consistent with the status-relationship cases from earlier in the nineteenth century. 
See supra notes 150–158 and accompanying text. 
 278. See White, supra note 85, at 91 (discussing David Hoffman’s 1817 Course of Legal 
Study). 
 279. 1 KENT, supra note 165, at 421. 
 280. Id. 
 281. When Kent introduced his discussion of “municipal law,” he explained that “[i]t is 
composed of written and unwritten, or statute and common law.” Id. at 419. 
 282. Id. at 431. 
 283. Id. at 432. 
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statutory language should be understood from the layperson’s perspec-
tive,284 but also from the lawyer’s perspective.285 Kent’s pronounce-
ments concerning the interpretation of the common law were no less 
paradoxical. In fact, he seemed to endorse paradox when he praised the 
eighteenth-century English judge, Lord Mansfield: 
Lord Mansfield frequently observed, that the certainty of a rule was 
often of much more importance in mercantile cases than the reason 
of it, and that a settled rule ought to be observed for the sake of prop-
erty; and yet, perhaps, no English judge ever made greater innova-
tions and improvements in the law, or felt himself less embarrassed 
with the disposition of the elder cases when they came in his way, to 
impede the operation of his enlightened and cultivated judgment.286 
Unquestionably, the preeminent treatise on constitutional law was 
Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, pub-
lished in 1833 in both a three-volume edition and a one-volume 
abridgement. 287 Story acknowledged that commentators and judges 
had strongly disagreed about the proper approach to constitutional in-
terpretation.288 He thus proposed to clarify: “Let us, then, endeavour 
to ascertain, what are the true rules of interpretation applicable to the 
constitution; so that we may have some fixed standard.”289 With un-
witting irony, he then reduced constitutional interpretation to nineteen 
rules. Indeed, constitutional scholars today probably would not even 
categorize some of Story’s so-called rules as true interpretive rules. For 
instance, rule 9 stated: “Where a power is remedial in its nature, there 
is much reason to contend, that it ought to be construed liberally.”290 
Rule 11 began: “And this leads us to remark, in the next place, that in 
the interpretation of the constitution there is no solid objection to im-
plied powers.”291 Each of these would-be rules appears to reflect a sub-
stantive constitutional position regarding governmental power rather 
 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 434. 
 286. Id. at 444. 
 287. JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 383 (1833) (in 3 volumes). 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 412. 
 291. Id. at 418. 
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than an interpretive guide or method that would apply to all constitu-
tional provisions. 
Most important, every time Story pronounced a rule that sug-
gested an originalist or strict constructionist approach, he soon pre-
sented a countervailing position that undermined the former would-
be rule. Rule 1 illustrates: “The first and fundamental rule in the in-
terpretation of all instruments is, to construe them according to the 
sense of the terms, and the intention of the parties.”292 This statement 
suggested an emphasis on public meaning (“the sense of the terms”) 
and original intent, but Story followed with a large qualification, more 
suggestive of an eclectic approach. “Mr. Justice Blackstone has re-
marked that the intention of a law is to be gathered from the words, 
the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the 
reason and spirit of the law.”293 Rule 7 suggested that constitutional 
meaning is fixed: “[The Constitution] is to have a fixed, uniform, per-
manent construction. It should be, so far at least as human infirmity 
will allow, not dependent upon the passions or parties of particular 
times, but the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.”294 Yet, rule 16 
emphasized constitutional ambiguity: “[W]ords, from the necessary 
imperfection of all human language, acquire different shades of mean-
ing, each of which is equally appropriate, and equally legitimate; each 
of which recedes in a wider or narrower degree from the others, ac-
cording to circumstances; and each of which receives from its general 
use some indefiniteness and obscurity.”295 
Story went so far as to repudiate explicitly “all notions of subjecting 
[the Constitution] to a strict interpretation.”296 In the midst of the vol-
atile political disputes of the 1790s, pitting Federalists (including 
Hamilton) against Republicans (including Madison), Jefferson had ad-
vocated for a rule of strict interpretation in accord with originalism, 
particularly with regard to congressional power. “On every question of 
construction [we should] carry ourselves back to the time, when the 
 
 292. Id. at 383. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 410. 
 295. Id. at 437. 
 296. Id. at 407. 
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constitution was adopted;” wrote Jefferson, “recollect the spirit mani-
fested in the debates; and instead of trying, what meaning may be 
squeezed out of the text, or invented against, conform to the probable 
one, in which it was passed.”297 Story sharply denounced this interpre-
tive rule because of its “utter looseness, and incoherence.”298 In the 
end, Story’s nineteen rules, when taken as a whole in all their pluralistic 
diversity, seem to endorse an eclectic interpretive approach leading to 
“reasonable” constitutional constructions.299 
To be clear, as was true with the early Supreme Court justices, the 
early treatise writers made innumerable statements that scholars today 
can pluck out of context to demonstrate that history supposedly sup-
ports some type of originalism. For example, Story, who was of course 
both a justice and a treatise writer (and a Harvard professor), wrote: 
“In the first place, then, every word employed in the constitution is to 
be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense.”300 Could Story 
have been more pellucid? He supported a plain meaning interpretive 
approach—except when he did not. He immediately continued the 
foregoing statement with the following: “unless the context furnishes 
some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.”301 
G. Framers and Ratifiers 
The previous sections identified a multitude of statements by trea-
tise writers and judges that signify a variety of approaches to constitu-
tional interpretation. Although I only occasionally mentioned the po-
litical contexts in which such statements were uttered, one should 
remember that the writers always entertained broad political ideolo-
gies, if not also specific political goals. Joseph Story did not write his 
nineteen rules of constitutional interpretation in a political vacuum, 
devoid of political preferences. To the contrary, Story favored national 
power over state sovereignty, and his interpretive rules reflected his 
 
 297. Id. at 390 n.1 (quoting Jefferson). 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 407; see id. at 441 (“[W]e should never forget, that it is an instrument of govern-
ment we are to construe”); WHITE, supra note 85, at 114–18 (discussing Story’s interpretive ap-
proach); William Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 983, 998 (2009) (ar-
guing that founders’ generation did not generally accept a strict interpretative approach). 
 300. STORY, supra note 287, at 436. 
 301. Id. (emphasis added). 
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ideology, sometimes quite distinctly.302 For instance, his express rejec-
tion of Jefferson’s strict constitutional interpretation must be under-
stood in relation to Jefferson’s political advocacy for state over national 
power.303 Given this, the fact that justices and scholars so rarely and 
anomalously invoked the reasonable man as a legal standard during the 
early decades of nationhood suggests that lawyers and laypersons, re-
gardless of their diverse political views, would not have conceived of 
reasonable-person originalism as a legitimate interpretive method. 
This final historical section focuses on the framers and ratifiers. 
Why place this discussion last? First, if anyone in American history 
uttered a definitive rule (or rules) for constitutional interpretation, it 
would have been the framers or ratifiers. Constitutional scholars today 
could legitimately deem the framers and ratifiers to be authoritative, 
presumably more so than the justices, the treatise writers, or anyone 
else. Hence, before dismissing reasonable-person originalism, one 
should examine its strongest potential historical justification. Second, 
an examination of the historical evidence surrounding the framing and 
ratification ultimately underscores the significance of political context. 
As will become clear, one cannot find any definitive statement of an 
interpretive method exactly because all interpretive claims during the 
framing and ratification were profoundly political—and obviously so. 
In the end, then, this final focus on the framers and ratifiers highlights 
a basic failing of reasonable-person originalism; it attempts the impos-
sible by claiming to filter politics out of (constitutional) history. 
During the constitutional convention and the ratification process, 
the debates focused on the meaning of the proposed Constitution ra-
ther than on the proper interpretive method or approach. Moreover, 
for many Americans involved in the ratification debates, the mean-
ing—or more precisely, the significance—of the Constitution revolved 
far less around particular provisions and far more around whether one 
favored preservation of the Union or preservation of the states as sov-
ereigns.304 The framers had specified a ratification process in Article 
VII that presented the people with a straightforward choice: Either 
 
 302. O’Neill, supra note 10, at 21; H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the 
Constitution: A Belated Review, 94 YALE L.J. 1285, 1293–94 (1985). 
 303. STORY, supra note 287, at 390 n.1. 
 304. RAKOVE, supra note 27, at 11–12. 
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take it (the proposed Constitution), or leave it. To supporters of the 
Constitution, like Hamilton and Madison, the nation could not con-
tinue to survive with the weak central government established under 
the Articles of Confederation.305 To opponents, however, ratification 
of the Constitution meant the destruction of the states. And perpetua-
tion of the states was paramount. According to Patrick Henry, the pro-
posed Constitution would “change our government” into a “fatal sys-
tem,” which would engender “the utter annihilation of the most 
solemn engagements of the states.”306 He further cautioned: “If a 
wrong step be now made, the republic may be lost forever.”307 State 
sovereignty was the umbrella protecting individual liberty: The peo-
ple’s “liberty will be lost, and tyranny must and will arise.”308 
Thus, when ratification is understood in its political context—as a 
crucial political decision—its central significance was the choice of a 
strong central government over strong state sovereigns. The legal his-
torian, Jack Rakove, narrows the meaning of ratification to an even 
finer point: “The only understanding we can be entirely confident the 
majority of ratifiers shared was that they were indeed deciding whether 
the Constitution would ‘form a more perfect union’ than the Articles 
of Confederation.”309 Even so, supporters and opponents of ratification 
also disagreed about the details. They differed widely in their interpre-
tations of specific provisions, and thus disputed likely constitutional 
applications and consequences. While the overarching choice between 
a strong central government and strong state sovereigns was clear, 
when it came to specifics, the Constitution meant different things to 
 
 305. E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasizing problems under 
Articles of Confederation). 
 306. PATRICK HENRY, OPENING SPEECH (VIRGINIA RATIFYING CONVENTION, JUNE 4, 
1788), reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: JANUARY TO AUGUST 1788, at 595 
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993). 
 307. Id. at 596. 
 308. Id.; see also Letter from Robert Yates & John Lansing, Jr. to Governor George Clinton 
(Jan. 14, 1788), On the Likely Failure of Liberty, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION: JANUARY TO AUGUST 17883–6 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (explaining why 
they refused to stay at constitutional convention). 
 309. RAKOVE, supra note 27, at 17. 
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different people. The documents and records of the ratification de-
bates in the several states reveal a “range of meanings” that Americans, 
at the time, attached to the Constitution.310 
Pauline Maier’s magisterial history of ratification illustrates, as a 
general matter, the complexities that historical research can uncover, 
and underscores, more specifically, the range of viewpoints, the vigor-
ous disagreements, which arose during the ratification process. For in-
stance, Maier emphasizes that the oppositional labels, Federalist and 
Antifederalist, were misleading because the supporting and opposing 
positions could not really be reduced to a distinct bipolarity. Federal-
ists mostly used these terms for political advantage—better to be ‘for’ 
something than ‘anti’—even though the terminology “oversimplified 
the debate[s].”311 
Unquestionably, critics of the Constitution did not articulate a 
univocal position. Some opponents “thought the Constitution was 
fundamentally flawed and should be rejected;”312 some thought the 
Constitution would be acceptable but only with certain pre-ratification 
amendments;313 some “wanted a new federal government, although not 
the one proposed;”314 and some disliked the Constitution but believed 
it could be sufficiently amended after ratification.315 
The supporters of the Constitution also did not speak with one 
voice. True, all Federalists “supported ratification of the Constitution 
‘as it now stands,’”316 yet Benjamin Franklin was not the only one to 
admit that the document was imperfect.317 Of course, Federalist sup-
porters “differed over what perfection would be.”318 Indeed, some 
wanted a centralized government so strong or consolidated that it 
 
 310. Id. at 7; see generally, 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS, 1776–1787 (Merrill 
Jensen ed., 1976); MAIER, supra note 98 (elaborating the disagreements over ratification). 
 311. MAIER, supra note 98, at 94. 
 312. Id. at 93. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Franklin, supra note 88, at 3; see MAIER, supra note 98, at 298 (during Virginia ratifying 
convention, Madison admitted that the document was imperfect). 
 318. MAIER, supra note 98, at 93. 
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would, in effect, eradicate the state sovereigns—exactly what some An-
tifederalists feared. Other supporters were disgusted with state govern-
mental corruption, wanted a strong centralized government that could 
keep the states in check, but were not ready to abandon state sover-
eignty completely. Some supporters were dissatisfied with constitu-
tional provisions that embodied political compromises from the Phil-
adelphia convention, such as equal Senate representation for states 
regardless of population.319 
Why, then, did all Federalists nonetheless support ratification of 
the Constitution, as proposed? Again, like Franklin, they recognized 
the unstable political ground that lay under the document. Most 
agreed that the nation would not likely survive further procrastination; 
action must be taken, or it would be too late. Federalists, therefore, 
feared proposals for pre-ratification amendments or a second conven-
tion. Either approach—amendments or convention—would undoubt-
edly generate additional political dithering and the likely implosion of 
the compromises supporting the original document. Political paralysis 
would set in, and the nation would stagger downward. Madison could 
not have been clearer than in a letter he wrote soon after ratification: 
You ask me why I agreed to the constitution proposed by the Con-
vention of Philada [sic]. I answer because I thought it safe to the lib-
erties of the people, and the best that could be obtained from the 
jarring interests of States, and the miscellaneous opinions of Politi-
cians; and because experience has proved that the real danger to 
America & to liberty lies in the defect of energy & stability in the pre-
sent establishments of the United States.320 
Given such sentiments, a prominent Federalist like James Wilson, 
who had opposed equal Senate representation at the Philadelphia con-
vention, turned around and defended this provision in the public de-
bates over ratification. Instead of denouncing the political compro-
mise, he celebrated it as “evidence of mutual concession and 
accommodation [that] ought rather to command a generous ap-
plause.”321 
 
 319. Id. at 93–94. 
 320.  Letter from James Madison to Philip Mazzei (Oct. 8, 1788), reprinted in Records, supra 
note 59, at 353 (emphasis in the original). 
 321. JAMES WILSON, SPEECH AT A PUBLIC MEETING IN PHILADELPHIA (OCT. 6, 1787), 
reprinted in XIII THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
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The multifaceted and zealous politics of ratification undermines 
reasonable-person originalism. Antifederalist opponents disagreed 
among themselves about the advantages and disadvantages of the Con-
stitution; Federalist supporters disagreed among themselves; and most 
important, at the time, ratification seemed far from certain.322 Feder-
alists not only were afraid that the required nine states would not ratify, 
but also were apprehensive that two crucial states, Virginia and New 
York, remained unpredictable throughout much of the ratification 
process.323 Without those two states, the union might wither, even if 
nine other states ratified. Given such political divergences and uncer-
tainties, one cannot possibly find a univocal public meaning or actual 
understanding for key constitutional provisions. Consequently, 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s reasonable-person standard—which sup-
posedly uncovers an objective semantic meaning for all constitutional 
provisions—cannot survive the political vortex of the framing and rat-
ification. Constitutional meaning cannot be abstracted from the poli-
tics because meaning was being forged in the crucible of politics. Cer-
tainly, during the ratification debates, any statement about 
constitutional meaning or interpretation must be viewed warily be-
cause Federalists and Antifederalists alike were motivated to posture 
for political advantage.324 The proposed and ratified Constitution was, 
through and through, a political document, the meaning of which 
emerged in the political disputes of the founding and subsequent eras. 
While the overarching significance of ratification was clear—one 
favored either a strong centralized government or strong state sover-
eigns—the vigorous disagreements about the details, about the mean-
ings of specific provisions, revealed multiple and competing interpre-
tive approaches. To be sure, debate never centered on interpretive 
methods or rules, but different approaches became manifest in the de-
bates over the substantive meanings and likely consequences of various 
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constitutional provisions. At a broad level, the Antifederalist oppo-
nents of ratification, on the one side, tended to favor a religious her-
meneutic consistent with many Protestant denominations. This ap-
proach claimed to be, in a sense, anti-interpretation. Individuals 
supposedly could directly discern a plain meaning from a text—reli-
gious or otherwise—without the aid of trained experts or interpretive 
rules. This was a hermeneutic of the common people. Federalist sup-
porters, on the other side, tended to favor a legal hermeneutic that had 
developed through decades (or centuries) of judicial interpretations of 
the (English) common law and statutes. From this perspective, the in-
terpretive traditions established in the legal profession could guide 
constitutional construction.325 
Without question, during the founding era the most important au-
thority for the American legal profession was Blackstone. The lawyers 
among the framers and ratifiers certainly would have been familiar 
with Blackstone, and likely would have trained primarily by reading 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England.326 Because of the ob-
scurity of the English Constitution, Blackstone’s views on statutory in-
terpretation were most relevant to the construction of the proposed 
American Constitution as a written legal document. In his chapter “Of 
the Nature of Laws in General,” Blackstone summarized his approach 
to statutory interpretation in a single paragraph, which he then elabo-
rated point by point in subsequent pages: 
The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the leg-
islator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was 
made, by signs the most natural and probable. And these signs are 
either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and con-
sequence, or the spirit and reason of the law.327 
In this passage, Blackstone appeared to state initially that legisla-
tors’ intentions are crucial, but he immediately clarified by suggesting 
that the interpreter discerns intent from objective signs or markers. 
Blackstone, that is, seemed less interested in the legislators’ subjective 
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thoughts than in what the legislators’ words signified to others. And 
then Blackstone broadened the inquiry. He explained that he would 
examine not only the legislators’ words but also a host of other factors, 
including context, consequences, and purposes.328 In the next chapter, 
focused on “the laws of England,”329 Blackstone returned to his exege-
sis of statutory interpretation, largely reiterating his prior points, but 
he added that an interpreter might need to alter his approach, depend-
ing on the specific type of statute. One method did not fit all legisla-
tion. Given Blackstone’s conservative reputation, his overall approach 
to statutory interpretation appears surprisingly flexible, near eclectic. 
Undoubtedly, in the United States, Blackstone’s legal hermeneutic 
strongly differed from the competing Protestant hermeneutic. Black-
stone implicitly recognized the importance of tradition, the develop-
ment of expertise, and the advantage of pluralistic openness to textual 
meaning. 
In any event, whenever one finds any explicit declaration from the 
founding era regarding interpretive method—whether from the Phil-
adelphia convention, the ratification debates, or the immediately en-
suing years—one must remember to understand the declaration within 
its political context. To underscore the importance of politics vis-à-vis 
interpretive views, the remainder of this section focuses on two of the 
leading framers, Hamilton and Madison, both of whom also played 
crucial roles in the ratification debates and then governmental affairs 
of the 1790s. I offer a caveat at the outset: based on this discussion of 
Hamilton and Madison, one might conclude that they should be con-
demned for inconsistency—indeed, today, they might be denounced 
as flip-floppers. And to be sure, their respective arguments sometimes 
appear inconsistent. But to emphasize and denounce Hamilton and 
Madison for inconsistency would be to miss the main point rather dra-
matically. Hamilton’s and Madison’s arguments instead illustrate the 
predominance during the founding era of an eclectic approach to con-
stitutional interpretation. Astute intellectuals, like Hamilton and Mad-
ison, readily drew upon a multitude of interpretive sources, varying 
their approaches in accord with their current political interests. 
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In his essays in the Federalist Papers, advocating for ratification, 
Hamilton suggested, in one breath, that constitutional interpretation 
was mechanical, but then suggested, in the next breath, that it was in-
herently discretionary and requires judgment. Throughout most of 
Federalist, Number 78, Hamilton maintained that judgment and discre-
tion were inherent in legal interpretation and judicial decision-mak-
ing.330 He repeatedly distinguished judicial will from judicial judg-
ment.331 Judicial will was unduly partisan, but judgment was 
unavoidable. Judgment, from this perspective, was not equivalent to 
judicial subjectivism, relativism, or activism. But toward the end of the 
essay, Hamilton depicted judicial decision making as more mechanical. 
While discussing judicial independence, he explained that lifetime ju-
dicial appointments would free federal judges from political pressure, 
so that when they decided cases, “nothing would be consulted but the 
Constitution and the laws.”332 He added that lifetime tenure would at-
tract judges well-qualified by study and knowledge. With such suitable 
judges, the nation would “avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts,” 
but only if the judges also were “bound down by strict rules and prec-
edents, which [would] serve to define and point out their duty in every 
particular case that comes before them.”333 
Thus, the end of Federalist Number 78, connotes a mechanical in-
terpretive approach harmonious with a strict or narrow construction 
of the Constitution. It appears, for instance, to controvert a liberal or 
flexible constitutional interpretation that might engender the recogni-
tion of implied national powers. Hamilton argued similarly in Federal-
ist Number 84. In that essay, Hamilton reasoned that a Bill of Rights 
was unnecessary because the Constitution would limit Congress to ex-
ercising the powers expressly enumerated in Article I, Section 8, such 
as the power to regulate interstate commerce. The Constitution, 
Hamilton insisted, would not invest Congress with a broad or open-
ended police power that would allow it to regulate for the general 
health and welfare. Consequently, the Constitution would not em-
power Congress to infringe on individual liberties, such as would be 
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protected by a Bill of Rights. A Bill of Rights, from this perspective, 
would be redundant.334 Hamilton, though, did not stop there. A Bill of 
Rights not only would be redundant, he reasoned, but it also would 
endanger individual rights and liberties. By delineating “exceptions to 
powers which are not granted,” a Bill of Rights “would afford a color-
able pretext to claim more than were granted.”335 A Bill of Rights 
would give power-hungry “men disposed to usurp, a plausible pre-
tense” for claiming that governmental powers extended over any rights 
and liberties not expressly protected.336 A Bill of Rights, in short, would 
provide a specious rationale for finding implied national powers. 
Yet, almost as soon as President Washington had appointed him 
the first Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton devised a complicated 
plan to put the nation on solid financial footing. The creation of a na-
tional bank was a crucial component of the plan, and Congress re-
sponded by passing a bill that would charter a bank. Washington, con-
templating the bill, asked Secretary of State Jefferson and Attorney 
General Edmund Randolph whether he should veto the action. Both 
encouraged Washington to do so. Jefferson, in particular, argued that 
the Constitution’s grant of congressional power should be strictly con-
strued. Following an argument that Madison had made when arguing 
against the bill in the House, Jefferson insisted that Congress should 
be limited to its expressly enumerated powers and should not be al-
lowed to exercise implied powers.337 The president thus asked Hamil-
ton to respond. Despite his earlier arguments in the Federalist Papers, 
suggesting that Congress should be limited to its expressly enumerated 
powers, Hamilton now unequivocally and enthusiastically argued that 
Congress must have implied powers, including a power to charter a 
bank.338 
Even with such constitutional wavering, Hamilton remained un-
swervingly constant in at least one respect: He always used the terms, 
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“reasonable man” and “prudent man,” in a non-technical sense. In the 
Federalist Papers, for instance, he would rhetorically underscore the 
persuasiveness of his arguments by emphasizing that any reasonable or 
prudent man would agree with him.339 In Federalist, Number 34, Ham-
ilton discussed the power to tax and its relation to national security. 
He acknowledged the possibility of European nations going to war 
against each other. He explained: “If it should break forth into a storm, 
who can insure us that in its progress a part of its fury would not be 
spent upon us? No reasonable man would hastily pronounce that we are 
entirely out of its reach.”340 No evidence suggests that Hamilton ever 
conceived of the “reasonable man” as a standard of legal judgment or 
liability. 
When it came to governmental power, Madison vacillated as much 
as Hamilton did. During the ratification debates and initially in Con-
gress, Madison insisted that the Constitution should be interpreted lib-
erally or flexibly. At the Virginia ratifying convention, Madison admit-
ted that “precision” in drafting the Constitution “was not so easily 
obtained.”341 Partly for that reason, he maintained that the Constitu-
tion should be given a “fair and liberal interpretation.”342 Approxi-
mately one year later, the first House was debating the organization of 
the executive branch. Madison moved to create three executive depart-
ments headed by secretaries “who shall be appointed by the president, 
by and with the advice and consent of the senate; and to be removeable 
[sic] by the president.”343 The president’s power to remove executive 
officials was especially contentious, but Madison insisted that the Con-
stitution granted the president an implied removal power, without the 
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advice and consent of the senate, which Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, 
seemed to require at least for appointments.344 Madison argued to in-
terpret the Constitution according to its “spirit and principles,” rather 
than in a strict manner that would be “very inconvenient in prac-
tice.”345 He continued in subsequent speeches to advocate for flexible 
constitutional interpretation and the recognition of an implied presi-
dential removal power.346 Nevertheless, by the early 1790s, Madison 
was arguing in the House for a strict or narrow constitutional con-
struction, which would deny Congress an implied power to charter a 
national bank and thus thwart part of Hamilton’s financial plan. Mad-
ison cautioned against Hamilton’s claim for implied congressional 
power: “If implications thus remote and thus multiplied can be linked 
together, a chain may be formed that will reach every object of legis-
lation, every object within the whole compass of political economy. 
The latitude of interpretation required by the bill is condemned by the 
rule furnished by the constitution itself.”347 
Madison also wavered in his references to (what would today be 
considered) originalist sources, such as framers’ intentions and original 
public meaning. He never explicitly relied on the framers’ subjective 
intentions as an interpretive guide to the Constitution, but he did hint 
at their relevance at least twice. In one of his speeches on an implied 
presidential removal power, he reasoned that without such power, the 
president would be unable to “take care that the laws be faithfully ex-
ecuted.”348 He added a rhetorical flourish to this point: “I can hardly 
bring myself to imagine the wisdom of the convention who framed the 
constitution, contemplated such incongruity.”349 Then, in his House 
speech opposing the national bank, he similarly alluded to the framers’ 
intentions.350 
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Madison’s references to original public meaning were more lucid, 
but far from uniform. During the ratification debates, several of Mad-
ison’s Federalist essays doubted the wisdom of allowing the people, rep-
resented most directly in the House, to decide constitutional ques-
tions.351 In Federalist Number 49, he revealed a distinct distrust of public 
opinion, which he feared would manifest passion more often than rea-
son, especially in constitutional matters.352 From Madison’s perspec-
tive, the greatest threat to a republic was factionalism, most likely to 
arise among the people and their direct representatives. He believed 
that the indirect elections of the president, through the electoral col-
lege, and the senators, through the state legislatures, would help filter 
out the people’s factionalist passions.353 Indeed, both Madison and 
Hamilton worried that the longer the public debate over ratification 
lasted, the more likely it became that the people would be infected with 
a factionalism leading them to grievous error.354 
Yet, in the midst of the political battles of the 1790s, Madison’s 
ostensible attitude toward the people and public opinion changed. In 
his House speech against the bank, he stated: “Contemporary and con-
current expositions are reasonable evidence of the meaning of the par-
ties.”355 Apparently, he now viewed public meaning to be a reliable in-
terpretive guide to the Constitution.356 Madison more distinctly 
accepted this position in a subsequent dispute over the Jay Treaty, ne-
gotiated by John Jay with Britain in 1794 and ratified by the Senate in 
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1795.357 On the one side, Hamilton favored the treaty and had de-
fended it with numerous arguments, one of which invoked the framers’ 
intentions.358 On the other side, Madison and the Republicans vehe-
mently disliked the treaty; they thought it commensurate to surrender. 
Consequently, they sought to resist it in the House, but did the Con-
stitution allow the House to refuse implementation of a ratified treaty? 
Madison spoke in the House about the treaty power, in general, and 
the Jay Treaty, in particular. In one remarkable passage, he explained 
his (current) approach to constitutional meaning.359 Despite his earlier 
allusions to the relevance of the framers’ intentions, he now appeared 
to repudiate their significance. The framers’ intentions, he said, 
“[c]ould never be regarded as the oracular guide in the expounding [of] 
the constitution.”360 Rather, he emphasized public meaning as an in-
terpretive guide, thus disregarding his earlier distrust of the people and 
public opinion. “As the [constitutional] instrument came from [the 
framers], it was nothing more than the draught of a plan, nothing but 
a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it, by the voice 
of the people, speaking through the several state conventions.”361 Mad-
ison suggested that public meaning should be derived from the actual 
understandings of delegates to the state ratifying conventions. “If we 
were to look therefore, for the meaning of the instrument, beyond the 
face of the instrument, we must look for it not in the general conven-
tion, which proposed, but in the state conventions, which accepted and 
ratified the constitution.”362 
To reiterate a crucial point, while Hamilton’s and Madison’s re-
spective arguments sometimes appear inconsistent, they primarily 
demonstrate the practice of constitutional eclecticism during the 
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founding era. Hamilton and Madison interpreted the Constitution 
from their respective political horizons, and as their horizons shifted, 
their views of the Constitution changed accordingly. When discerning 
constitutional meaning, they drew upon a multitude of available inter-
pretive sources, varying their approaches based on their current polit-
ical interests. Whether they explicitly or implicitly articulated those 
interpretive approaches, Hamilton and Madison spoke and wrote as 
politicians embroiled in volatile disputes. They were not Platonic phi-
losopher kings ruminating about the ideal approach to constitutional 
interpretation. 
A vivid and unequivocal final illustration of interpretive eclecticism 
is worth sketching. Madison, it will be recalled, opposed the chartering 
of the first national bank in the early 1790s. In arguing that Congress 
lacked the power to create the bank, he insisted that the Constitution 
should be strictly construed.363 To support this position, he alluded to 
the framers’ intentions but, more clearly, maintained that original pub-
lic meaning should guide constitutional interpretation.364 As fortune 
would have it, in 1815, he was president when Congress passed a bill 
chartering a second national bank. He vetoed this bill, but on policy 
rather than constitutional grounds.365 In fact, he reasoned that a na-
tional bank, “once unconstitutional, had become constitutional.”366 He 
explained that “the constitutional authority of the Legislature” to char-
ter a bank had been established “by repeated recognitions under varied 
circumstances of the validity of such an institution in acts of the legis-
lative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government, accompa-
nied by indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general 
will of the nation.”367 In other words, even if original public meaning 
had precluded congressional power to charter a bank—as Madison had 
previously argued—precedent had changed the meaning of the Con-
stitution. And precedent arose not only from judicial decisions, but also 
from the actions of the executive, the legislature, and the people in 
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general. From Madison’s perspective, constitutional meaning was not 
fixed at the time of ratification, whether by original public meaning or 
anything else. To the contrary, a variety of factors could shape the 
proper current interpretation of the text. 
IV. Conclusion 
McGinnis and Rappaport, like other originalists, seek interpretive 
purity: constitutional meaning devoid of politics, discretion, and inde-
terminacy. Focused on this goal, McGinnis and Rappaport are meth-
odological reductionists. They seek to reduce constitutional interpre-
tation to a single legitimate method—reasonable-person originalism—
which, they claim, filters out the impurities and leaves a fixed and ob-
jective constitutional meaning. For all originalists, not only reasona-
ble-person originalists, when history is processed pursuant to the 
proper method, the result is purity. Thus, McGinnis and Rappaport 
maintain that if a Supreme Court justice (or other constitutional inter-
preter) applies reasonable-person methodology to the historical mate-
rials, then the justice will discern pristine constitutional meaning. 
As a general matter, McGinnis and Rappaport’s methodological 
hopes (as well as those of other originalists) collide fatally with an im-
penetrable obstacle. They want history, as processed through original-
ist method, to eliminate judicial discretion and constitutional ambigu-
ity, but historical understanding uncovers contingencies and subtexts. 
Historical thinking leads to complexity rather than to univocal mean-
ing. 
More specifically, McGinnis and Rappaport claim that history 
both justifies using reasonable-person originalism and specifies the 
precise contours of that approach. “In our view,” they argue, “the ap-
propriate interpretive rules are those that would have been employed 
in the process of enacting the Constitution. Those interpretive rules 
would be those that a reasonable person at the time of the Constitu-
tion’s enactment would have applied to the Constitution.”368 But this 
argument is a non sequitur: The historical conclusion does not follow 
from the historical premise. Even if McGinnis and Rappaport cor-
rectly advocate for applying the interpretive rules “that would have 
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been employed in the process of enacting the Constitution,”369 those 
rules would not have included any invocation of a reasonable man (or 
reasonable person). From 1787 to 1789, when states debated ratifica-
tion of the proposed Constitution, neither a lawyer nor a layperson 
would have proposed interpreting the Constitution pursuant to a rea-
sonable-person standard. The historical evidence shows that, while 
“reasonable man” and “prudent man” were commonly used figures of 
speech, the reasonable or prudent man was not widely conceived at 
that time to be a legal standard of judgment or liability. Given that 
McGinnis and Rappaport dismiss other interpretive approaches be-
cause they do not fit the historical materials,370 this lack of historical 
support for reasonable-person originalism subverts their argument, by 
their own measure. 
If reasonable-person originalism is the purest and most advanced 
originalism extant today, then constitutional scholars and jurists need 
to start looking elsewhere for constitutional guidance. In fact, the his-
torical evidence not only undermines reasonable-person originalism, 
but also supports an alternative: eclecticism.371 Of course, because 
McGinnis and Rappaport and other originalists are methodological re-
ductionists, an eclectic interpretive approach is anathema to them. 
They want to invoke history—typically claiming that their methods 
have deep historical roots—but they refuse to see the evidence with a 
historical eye. During the early decades of nationhood, numerous 
judges and treatise writers—as well as the icons, Hamilton and Madi-
son—were eclectic, invoking multiple sources of constitutional mean-
ing. To be sure, these early Americans relied on originalist sources. 
They considered public meaning and framers’ intentions, but they also 
considered practical consequences, precedents, history, and so on. We 
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